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ABSTRACT 
 
In Essay 1, the impact of organization capital on managerial short-termism is examined. 
In the current literature, competing views exist on the relation between organization capital and 
managerial short-termism. In an attempt to resolve these competing views, I split corporate 
activities associated with managerial short-termism into two broad categories, internal and 
external dimensions, and then examine the impact of organization capital on each category. I 
predict that an investment in organization capital internally encourages long-term management in 
real operations, whereas such an investment induces short-term pressure on management in an 
external dimension. Consistent with my predictions, I find that firms with greater organization 
capital switch from real activities manipulation to accrual-based earnings management. My 
hypotheses are consistent even after controlling for corporate governance. The results are robust 
to using alternative measures of organization capital and employing a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) test and change regressions for the endogeneity issues as well as the omitted variable 
problems. I then employ a difference-in-difference (DID) methodology that relies on the 
exogenous variation in organization capital generated by technology shock to demonstrate that 
my predictions continue to hold. I also document that the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) could attenuate the problematic influence of organization capital on accruals. The impact 
of organization capital on real activities manipulation is more pronounced for firms with 
competitive industries. By providing a channel between organization capital and managerial 
mindsets, my paper attempts to facilitate future research on the impact of organization capital on 
various corporate outcomes. 
v 
To extend the internal and external mechanisms of Essay 1, Essay 2 aims to create a 
better understanding of how organization capital and corporate cash holdings are related. 
Organization capital is positively associated with growth opportunities. In addition, I find that 
organization capital has a positive impact on cash-cash flow sensitivity, implying that an increase 
in organization capital can lead firms to rely more on internal financing. Taken together, these 
suggest that firms with high organization capital tend to build more cash holdings. I also reveal 
the disciplining presence that the threat of hostile takeover in high organization capital firms has. 
The results, even after controlling for idiosyncratic risk, support my baseline findings. My 
empirical results are robust to using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) test, change regressions, 
and the difference-in-difference (DID) test addressing omitted variables and endogeneity 
concerns. The findings in my paper (i) highlight the precautionary motive behind corporate cash 
holdings and the underlying channels that show how organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings are related, and (ii) emphasize a growing importance of the disciplining role of 
corporate governance for high organization capital firms. 
 
 
  
vi 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................................x 
ESSAY I: ORGANIZATION CAPITAL AND MANAGERIAL SHORT-TERMISM ...............11 
1  Introduction ...........................................................................................................................11 
2  Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development ......................................................................17 
2.1  Explanations of Organization Capital ............................................................................. 17 
2.2  Organization Capital, Managerial Short-termism, and Earnings Management .............. 19 
3  Data and Variable Measurement ...........................................................................................23 
3.1  Data ................................................................................................................................. 23 
3.2  Measure for Organization Capital .................................................................................. 24 
3.3  Measure for Real Activities Manipulation ..................................................................... 25 
3.4  Measure for Accrual-based Earnings Management ........................................................ 27 
3.5  Control Variables ............................................................................................................ 27 
4  Organization Capital and Earnings Management: Empirical Results ...................................28 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................................... 28 
4.2  Impact of Organization Capital on Earnings Management ............................................ 30 
5  Robustness Tests ...................................................................................................................31 
5.1  Alternative Measures of Organization Capital ............................................................... 31 
5.2  Subsample Analysis ........................................................................................................ 32 
5.3  Endogeneity Concerns .................................................................................................... 33 
5.4  Difference-in-Differences Approach .............................................................................. 35 
5.5  Using Investment Component of Main SG&A Expenditure .......................................... 38 
5.6  Industry Concentration and Corporate Governance ....................................................... 39 
5.7  Idiosyncratic Risk ........................................................................................................... 41 
5.8  Managerial Ability and Employee Satisfaction .............................................................. 42 
6  Conclusion .............................................................................................................................43 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................................69 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................................71 
ESSAY 2: ORGANIZATION CAPITAL AND CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS ..................75 
vii 
1  Introduction ...........................................................................................................................75 
2  Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development ......................................................................79 
2.1  Organization Capital and Corporate Cash Holdings ...................................................... 80 
2.2  Growth Opportunities Channel ....................................................................................... 81 
2.3  Financial Constraints Channel ........................................................................................ 82 
2.4  Corporate Governance Channel ...................................................................................... 84 
3  Data and Variable Measurement ...........................................................................................85 
3.1  Data ................................................................................................................................. 85 
3.2  Measure of Cash Holdings and Organization Capital .................................................... 85 
3.3  Control Variables ............................................................................................................ 87 
4  Empirical Results ..................................................................................................................87 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................................... 87 
4.2  Impact of Organization Capital on Corporate Cash Holdings ........................................ 88 
4.3  Organization Capital and Growth Opportunities ............................................................ 89 
4.4  Organization Capital and Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity .................................................. 90 
4.5  Organization Capital and the Threat of a Hostile Takeover ........................................... 92 
5  Robustness Tests ...................................................................................................................93 
5.1  Alternative Measures of Organization Capital ............................................................... 93 
5.2  Omitted Variable and Endogeneity Concerns ................................................................ 97 
5.3  Difference-in-Difference Approach ............................................................................... 98 
5.4  Subsample Analysis ...................................................................................................... 100 
5.5  Idiosyncratic Risk ......................................................................................................... 101 
6  Conclusion ...........................................................................................................................101 
APPENDIX A ..............................................................................................................................122 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................124 
 
  
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1 Univariate Statistics for Sample Firms ......................................................................... 46 
Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix ........................................................................................................ 47 
Table 1.3 Organization Capital by Industry .................................................................................. 48 
Table 1.4 Organization Capital and Earnings Management ......................................................... 50 
Table 1.5 Annual Decile Rank of Organization Capital ............................................................... 51 
Table 1.6 Industry-Median Adjusted Organization Capital .......................................................... 52 
Table 1.7 Pre- and Post- SOX periods .......................................................................................... 53 
Table 1.8 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis ............................................................ 56 
Table 1.9 Change Regression Analysis ........................................................................................ 58 
Table 1.10 Difference-in-Differences Analysis ............................................................................ 59 
Table 1.11 Using Investment Component of Main SG&A........................................................... 61 
Table 1.12 Industry Concentration ............................................................................................... 62 
Table 1.13 Corporate Governance ................................................................................................ 63 
Table 1.14 Idiosyncratic Risk ....................................................................................................... 64 
Table 1.15 Managerial Ability ...................................................................................................... 65 
Table 1.16 Employee Satisfaction ................................................................................................ 66 
 
Table 2.1 Univariate Statistics for Sample Firms ....................................................................... 104 
Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix ...................................................................................................... 105 
Table 2.3 Median Cash Holdings for Organization Capital Deciles .......................................... 106 
Table 2.4 Organization Capital and Corporate Cash Holdings ................................................... 107 
ix 
Table 2.5 Organization Capital and Growth Opportunities ........................................................ 108 
Table 2.6 Organization Capital and Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity ............................................... 109 
Table 2.7 Threat of a Hostile Takeover ...................................................................................... 110 
Table 2.8 Annual Decile Rank of Organization Capital ............................................................. 111 
Table 2.9 Industry-Median Adjusted Organization Capital ........................................................ 112 
Table 2.10 Using Investment Component of Main SG&A Expenditure .................................... 113 
Table 2.11 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis ........................................................ 115 
Table 2.12 Change Regression Analysis .................................................................................... 116 
Table 2.13 Difference-in-Difference Analysis ........................................................................... 117 
Table 2.14 Subsample Analysis .................................................................................................. 119 
Table 2.15 Idiosyncratic Risk ..................................................................................................... 120 
 
  
x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1 Time Line: Managers with Greater Organization Capital ........................................... 67 
Figure 1.2 Technological Collaboration Network ........................................................................ 68 
 
Figure 2.1 Average Cash Ratio from 1987 through 2016 ........................................................... 121 
 
11 
ESSAY I: ORGANIZATION CAPITAL AND MANAGERIAL SHORT-TERMISM  
DOUBLE EDGED DIMENSIONS OF ORGANIZATION CAPITAL 
 
 
 
“The best thing you can do for employees—a perk better than foosball or free sushi—is hire only 
‘A’ players to work alongside them. Excellent colleagues trump everything else.”  
—Patty McCord, Netflix’s former CEO, quoted in Harvard Business Review, January-February 
2014 issue. 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 Managerial short-termism or myopic management, one type of agency problem, is 
defined as a manager’s tendency to pursue short-term corporate performance by sacrificing the 
long-term value of the firm (Stein 1989; Edmans 2009; Asker et al. 2015). Managerial short-
termism is reflected in overproduction, reduction in marketing expenditure, cuts in research and 
development expenditure (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow & Sloan 1991; Bushee 1998; Graham et al. 
2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Tong & Zhang 2014), and accrual management.1 In this study, I 
attempt to provide a possible explanation for the impact of corporate investment decisions on 
managerial short-termism. I do this by focusing on organization capital.  
                                                 
1 Overproduction, reduction in marketing expenditure and cuts in research and development expenses can be classified 
as real activities manipulation. Both real activities manipulation and accrual management are defined as earnings 
management. More details are provided in Section 2.2. 
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 Prescott and Visscher (1980) define organization capital as the human capital of the 
employees as well as the accumulated know-how that allows a company to match employees to 
projects and teams with which they are suited. Google, for instance, uses high-quality resources 
for multi-staged processes when searching for new employees. In order to make sure the new 
employee’s talents match with the need of the project team, Google’s hiring processes include 
numerous interviews, feedbacks, and screenings by potential project members, hiring committee, 
and even Google CEO Larry Page (Bock 2015). These hiring processes, which involve an 
investment in organization capital, ensure that future employees will effectively contribute to the 
company’s performance.2 In general, organization capital enables firms to efficiently utilize 
human resources (Lev & Radhakrishnan 2005; Carlin et al. 2012). Much scholarly work has been 
done on the topics of organization capital and managerial short-termism, but no systematic 
attempt to connect the two has been undertaken. This study, therefore, attempts to investigate 
how organization capital affects the myopic management of a corporation.  
 Prior literature shows competing views of the relation between organization capital and 
managerial short-termism. One view advocates that organization capital alleviates managerial 
short-termism for the following reasons: (i) organization capital leads key employees to expect 
higher future compensation (Atkeson & Kehoe 2005; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013); (ii) the 
firms with greater organization capital achieve better managerial quality and higher employee 
satisfaction (Li et al. 2017); (iii) according to the issues discussed in (i) and (ii), employee 
turnover becomes lower for firms with greater organization capital (Carlin et al. 2012). These 
issues can also be applied to managers who are part of employees and are in the top positions in 
                                                 
2 Another example of organization capital is Apple’s supply chain management system which requires effective 
agglomeration of knowledge for product design, manufacturing outsourcing, warehousing, and retailing around the 
world. This system cannot be easily codified by its competitors. 
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corporate structures. Moreover, it is beneficial to have a long-term view of employees to achieve 
long-term projects or goals for management. As a result, organization capital mitigates 
managerial short-termism by encouraging corporate employees to have a long-term perspective.  
 On the other hand, greater organization capital can intensify short-term pressure on 
managers by firm outsiders. The results obtained by Stein (1989) and Edmans (2011) imply that 
because of the intangibility of organization capital, investments in organization capital are more 
difficult for firm outsiders to correctly evaluate. Due to information asymmetry between firm 
outsiders and managers, stock investors or analysts may regard an investment in organization 
capital as risky or even inefficient. Stock market participants may also require a higher risk 
premium for bearing the risk of a potential loss of key talents vested with greater organization 
capital (Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013). This kind of downward pressure on a firm’s current 
stock price could force managers to pursue short-term performance in order to satisfy the 
demand from stock market participants. Organization capital is therefore likely to intensify short-
term pressure on managers.  
 In an attempt to resolve these competing views, I endeavor to create a deeper 
understanding of managerial short-termism, arguing that managerial short-termist activities are 
not homogeneous. Specifically, corporate activities associated with managerial short-termism 
can be split into two broad categories: (1) managerial short-termism in real operations, also 
known as myopic management in real operations, and (2) managerial short-termism through 
accruals, also known as myopic management through accruals. Managerial short-termism in real 
operations is defined as myopic management in real operations, such as overproduction, 
reduction in marketing expenditure, and cuts in research and development (R&D) expenditure. 
The other type of myopic management is managerial short-termism through accruals which aims  
14 
at manipulating current earnings by adjusting the level of accruals in a financial statement.  
 Based on prior studies, I would suggest that organization capital can internally enhance 
the prospects of real operations. Firms expect their key talents to generate operational innovation 
and quality enhancement. The majority of organization capital is invested in key talents (Prescott 
& Visscher 1980; Lustig et al. 2011; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013), and an investment in 
organization capital, such as job training, may develop key talents’ abilities (Black & Lynch 
2005). When organization capital is accumulated, and thus the increased abilities of key talents 
are more effectively utilized and better matched to projects and team members (Atkeson & 
Kehoe 2005; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013), the firm’s real operations are going to have better 
prospects. In other words, as organization capital increases, the prospects of real operations are 
enhanced, so that it becomes costlier to managers to compromise real operations. In this sense, 
organization capital mitigates myopic management in real operations. 
 In addition to the benefits of organization capital for reducing myopic management in 
real operations, this paper uncovers the one potential dark side of organization capital: the danger 
that greater organization capital may induce myopic management through accruals in an external 
dimension. Compared to investments in physical capital, investments in organization capital are 
invisible. The implications of the work of Stein (1989) and Edmans (2011) suggest that 
investments in organization capital are more difficult for outsiders to correctly evaluate because 
of the intangibility of such investments. Managers with greater organization capital may 
therefore come under more severe short-term earnings pressure from stock investors. Moreover, 
as organization capital accumulates, myopic management in real operations becomes costly for 
the managers. Taken together, in order to deal with short-term pressure from stock investors and 
the higher cost of myopic management in real operations, managers rely more on myopic 
15 
management through accruals. Investment in organization capital therefore strengthens the long-
term prospects of real operations, whereas such an investment pressures managers to engage in 
myopic management through accruals. 
 By employing earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism (Graham et 
al. 2005; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Chen et al. 2015), I find empirical evidence consistent with 
my hypotheses: (i) that firms with greater organization capital conduct fewer subsequent real 
activities manipulation and (ii) that firms with greater organization capital use more subsequent 
accrual-based earnings management. In sum, these empirical results suggest that an investment 
in organization capital encourages firms to switch from real activities manipulation to accrual 
management.  
 I also document that the positive relation between organization capital and subsequent 
accrual-based earnings management is significantly reduced after the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which alleviates the problematic influence of organization capital on 
subsequent accrual-based earnings management. Another potential moderating factor is industry 
market structure. For instance, for firms in relatively less competitive industries (e.g. 
monopolists or oligopolists), the role of organization capital lessens due to high economic rent 
that is obtained from less competition. As firms belong to relatively less competitive industries, 
the negative impact of organization capital on real activities manipulation weakens. However, 
there is no significant relation between industry competitiveness and the positive impact of 
organization capital on accrual-based earnings management. 
 To address potential endogeneity issues such as reverse causality and omitted variable 
problems, I utilize several econometric methodologies. First, I conduct a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) test using the initial value of SG&A expenditure as an instrumental variable (IV). I find 
16 
that the relation between organization capital and earnings management is robust to 2SLS 
estimation. Second, I also focus on the year-to-year changes in dependent and independent 
variables. The results from this Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) change regressions show that 
change in organization capital leads to a decrease in subsequent real activities manipulation and 
an increase in subsequent accrual-based earnings management, which is an additional support to 
my hypotheses. Third, I use technology shock during years between 1991 and 1995 as an 
exogenous shock to organization capital and show that firms with a larger improvement in 
organization capital due to the technology shock experience (i) a larger drop in overproduction 
and (ii) a greater increase in accrual management than those with a smaller increase in 
organization capital. These results confirm the causal effect of organization capital on 
managerial short-termism. 
 This paper contributes to the earnings management literature by finding that organization 
capital reduces real activities manipulation. Unlike accrual-based earnings management, real 
activities manipulation has a directly negative impact on corporate future cash flows, which 
implies that real activities manipulation is more likely to be detrimental to subsequent operating 
performance than is accrual-based earnings management (Cohen & Zarowin 2010). 
Nevertheless, real activities manipulation significantly increased whereas accrual-based earnings 
management declined after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 (Cohen et al. 
2008). This evidence naturally raises an important question on how real activities manipulation 
can be mitigated especially during post-SOX period. Regarding a remedy for this important 
issue, my study sheds light on the potential role of investment in organization capital for 
discouraging real activities manipulation. As a symptom of organization capital, I also find that 
organization capital is positively associated with accrual-earnings management. However, such a 
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problematic impact of organization capital on accruals is significantly weaker after the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which is discussed in greater depth in Section 
5.2. 
 My study is also related to the literature on organization capital. Greater organization 
capital leads to better employee abilities (Black & Lynch 2005), better managerial quality, higher 
employee satisfaction (Li et al. 2017), and lower employee turnover (Carlin et al. 2012). In 
addition, three recent papers have shown beneficial consequences from organization capital: 
Francis et al. (2015) find that organization capital can facilitate firm innovation; organization 
capital may generate synergies in Mergers and Acquisitions (Li & Zhang 2015; Li et al. 2017). 
The findings of this prior literature show that greater organization capital can motivate managers 
to take a long-term perspective. According to the arguments of Stein (1989) and Edmans (2011), 
however, organization capital, as one type of an intangible asset, can lead to short-term 
performance pressure on managers. To my knowledge, my study is the first step to try to resolve 
the existing competing views on the impact of organization capital on managerial short-termism. 
 I organize my paper as follows. The next section develops my hypotheses. Section 3 
defines sample selection and variable measurements. Section 4 explains empirical models and 
results. Section 5 describes robustness tests. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2  Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1  Explanations of Organization Capital 
 Organization capital is human capital and know-how about how to hire, allocate, and 
train people in an organization. For example, when a movie company starts its project, the 
company must determine who will be hired as the main actor, actress, and director. Furthermore, 
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the company needs to allocate responsibilities for camera, lights, music, and computer graphics. 
Stuntmen, actors, and actresses also need to be trained for combat and action scenes. These are 
important issues because they can greatly affect the movie’s quality. In this sense, the 
organization capital is an essential element for a company’s success. 
 According to Prescott and Visscher (1980), there are three ways that firms invest in 
organization capital. They: (1) invest in information about matching employees to projects; (2) 
invest in information about matching employees to teams (e.g., team work); and (3) invest in the 
human capital of the employees. Acquiring organization capital requires time and money. One 
example would be Google’s hiring processes. Google utilizes multi-staged interviews conducted 
by diverse groups within their organization to learn about applicants (Bock 2015). Google’s 
complex and costly interview process efficiently allows the company to match their new 
employees to projects and team members. Investment in employee human capital can also 
involve professional development workshops and training processes. Overall, through a trial-
error process, firms may gather know-how about how to better hire, allocate, and train their 
employees. This process will help the firm increase its organization capital. 
 Another example of organization capital is seen in an oil company. The company has 
multiple processes such as refinery R&D projects, productions, delivery systems and sales 
strategies. These processes require employees to have various skills and know-how about how to 
hire, allocate, and train new employees. Because these processes are not limited to a specific 
project, organization capital can be applied very comprehensively. By using organization capital 
comprehensively, the company can achieve synergies and greater efficiency in its overall  
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system.3 Hence, organization capital enhances a firm's comparative advantage, so that the firm 
can consistently perform better than other firms.4 
 In today’s knowledge-based economy, intangible assets such as organization capital are a 
crucial resource required for companies to succeed against their competitors (Zingales 2000; 
Edmans 2011). Considering that managerial short-termism has become one of the most critical 
problems in the modern firm, it is natural to wonder how organization capital affects myopic 
management within a corporation.5 
 
2.2  Organization Capital, Managerial Short-termism, and Earnings Management 
 Managers may pursue short-term performance for a firm by sacrificing its long-term 
value, which is a type of agency problem. In this section, I focus on reaching a better 
understanding of two categories of managerial short-termism. I do this because corporate 
activities related to managerial short-termism are heterogeneous. Specifically, I divide corporate 
activities associated with managerial short-termism into two groups: 
 
1) Managerial short-termism in real operations 
Myopic management in real operational activities (e.g., overproduction, reduction in mark
eting expenditure, cuts in research and development expenditure): by compromising these
                                                 
3 Li et al. (2017) find that organization capital is a key factor in Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) synergies. They 
also find that organization capital is positively associated with innovative efficiency. 
4 A McKinsey Global Institute (2002) study of companies between 1982 and 1999 finds that those that invest more in 
organization capital during market recessions had better average corporate performance. 
5 For instance, in order to meet a short-term earnings target, managers might sacrifice the firm’s long-run growth 
opportunities by cutting research and development (R&D) expenditure (Baber et al. 1991; Dechow & Sloan 1991; 
Bushee 1998; Graham et al. 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Tong & Zhang 2014). 
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 real operations, managers can boost current earnings. 
 
2) Managerial short-termism through accruals 
Myopic management through accruals; by compromising earnings quality through 
adjusting the level of accruals in a financial statement, managers can boost current 
earnings. 
 
 In recent years, managerial short-termism has been studied by employing earnings 
management as a proxy for managerial short-termism (Graham et al. 2005; Cohen & Zarowin 
2010; Chen et al. 2015). According to the prior literature (Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen & Zarowin 
2010; Zang 2012), earnings management is conducted through two major channels: (1) real 
activities manipulation (RAM) and (2) accrual-based earnings management (AM). Real 
activities manipulation aims at boosting current earnings through myopic management of 
operations, such as cutting discretionary expenses, overproductions, or sales manipulations by 
unsustainable price discounts (Roychowdhury 2006). The other myopic way of boosting current 
earnings is accrual-based earnings management, which manipulates the level of accruals through 
managers’ discretion and judgment on accounting methods (Dechow et al. 1995). Prior literature 
therefore employs both real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings management as a 
proxy for managerial short-termism (Graham et al. 2005; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Chen et al. 
2015). 
 Accrual management does not directly affect the firm’s cash flows whereas real activities 
manipulation is detrimental to the firm’s future cash flows generated from real operations 
(Cohen & Zarowin 2010). After real activities manipulation is realized, the firm is likely to 
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decide the level of accruals (Zang 2012). In line with this logic, I investigate how real activities 
manipulation can be affected by organization capital; then, under this circumstance, I examine 
the impact of organization capital on accrual-based earnings management. 
 
[Figure 1.1 about here] 
 
 In Figure 1.1, the impact of organization capital on managerial short-termism is 
illustrated during two time periods. A firm manages its real operations during a period, and 
issues its financial statement at the end of that time period. First, there is an increase in 
organization capital during Period 1. From that point, accumulated organization capital may 
develop the abilities of key talents (Black & Lynch 2005), which can then be effectively 
distributed to projects and team members (Atkeson & Kehoe 2005; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 
2013).6 Under this circumstance, during Period 1, the company can have better future prospects 
for its real operations.  
 During period 2, the firm can have better prospects for its real operations. As real 
operations are compromised by myopic management in real operations, the opportunity cost of 
myopic management in real operations becomes larger. As the prospects of real operations 
improve, the increased opportunity cost of myopic management in real operations can lead 
managers to engage less in myopic management in real operations. That is, greater organization 
capital reduces managerial short-termism in real operations. Considering that managers take 
responsibility for the management of real operations, I suggest that organization capital has a 
                                                 
6 Work-force trainings, as one of essential part of organization capital, may nurture the abilities of employees (Black 
& Lynch 2005). 
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negative impact on real activities manipulation. I thus construct the following hypothesis 
describing the negative impact of organization capital on real activities manipulation.7 
 
 Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relation between organization capital and real 
activities manipulation. 
 
 As a result of an investment in organization capital during Period 1, increased short-term 
pressure from firm outsiders also occurs during Period 2. Due to the intangibility of such 
investment, firm outsiders may inaccurately evaluate the investment in organization capital 
(Stein 1989; Edmans 2011). Thus, managers with greater organization capital may suffer from 
increased short-term pressure from firm outsiders during Period 2. 
 At the end of Period 2, the firm reports earnings by choosing the level of accruals in its 
financial statement. Managers utilize real activities manipulation and accrual management as 
substitutes for each other: for instance, when real activities manipulation becomes costlier to 
managers, they engage in fewer real activities manipulation and more accrual management 
(Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012). Accordingly, as the prospects of real operations improve, the 
increased opportunity cost of real activities manipulation can induce managers to participate less 
in real activities manipulation; instead, they rely more on accrual-based earnings management. 
                                                 
7 Since organization capital measure is heavily dependent on SG&A expenditure, there is a concern that real activities 
manipulation and organization capital are not mutually exclusive. To mitigate such concern, I employ the following 
procedures: (i) in my baseline model, SG&A expenditure is excluded from real activities manipulation measures; (ii) 
as a robustness test, In Table 1.11, I use organization capital using the investment portion of SG&A expenditure from 
Enache and Srivastava (2017) in order to more precisely extract and measure organization capital; (iii) in Tables 1.15 
and 1.16, I use alternative measures of organization capital, which are not heavily dependent on SG&A expenditure, 
including managerial ability and employ satisfaction. 
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Because of the higher cost of managerial short-termism in real operations and increased short-
term pressure from firm outsiders, managers rely more on myopic management through accruals. 
In line with this logic, greater organization capital can exacerbate managerial short-termism 
through accruals. This implies that managers are more likely to engage in accrual-based earnings 
management, which is consistent with Zang (2012)’s finding that after a lower level of real 
activities manipulation is realized, firms try to offset the effect by increasing the level of accrual-
based earnings management. I therefore suggest: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between organization capital and accrual-
based earnings management. 
 
3  Data and Variable Measurement 
3.1  Data 
 My empirical tests consist of firm-year data from two sources. Corporate financial 
statement information is obtained from the Compustat annual database and stock returns are 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices monthly stock returns files. Consistent 
with the work of Cohen and Zarowin (2010), for inclusion into my analyses, I require at least 
eight observations for each 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry-year 
grouping. I also require for my analyses that each firm-year observation has enough information 
necessary to calculate earnings management proxies, organization capital, and control variables. 
To reduce effects of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The 
sample consists of 73,759 firm-year observations from January, 1987 through December, 2016. 
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3.2  Measure for Organization Capital 
 I follow the Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) model for measuring organization capital. 
For this model, the stock of organization capital is calculated by adding up the deflated flows 
from sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenditure. The reason SG&A expenditure is 
related to organization capital is that SG&A expenses include information technology expenses 
and components of labor costs such as employee wages, training, and payment to consultants 
(Lev & Radhakrishnan 2005). Any value generated from SG&A cost can be firm-specific, and 
key talents must be given some part of the value that can be considered as organization capital 
(Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013). 
 To calculate organization capital using the perpetual inventory model of Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013), the initial state of organization capital needs to be determined using the 
following Equation:  
 
 𝑂𝐶0 = 
𝑆𝐺𝐴1
𝑔+𝛿0
                                  (1) 
  
 where OC0 represents the initial state of organization capital at time 0, SGA1 stands for 
SG&A expenditure at time 1, and g is the average real growth rate of firm-level SG&A 
expenditure. Additionally, δ0 represents a depreciation rate of organization capital at time 0. I 
put the value of zero into missing data in SG&A expenditure and choose g and δ0 as 10% and 
15%, respectively. 
 Once the initial state of organization capital is determined, the following Equation 
considers depreciation and deflated SG&A expenditure to determine the estimated value of 
organization capital at each time period after its initial state:  
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 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = (1 −  δ0)𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
                  (2) 
  
 I use consumer price index at time t (cpit) for calculating the deflated value of SG&A 
expenditure. At each time period, I scale a firm i’s organization capital by its book value of total 
assets (OC_TA_RATIO). To address possible measurement error, I also use alternative 
measurements of organization capital as robustness tests in Section 5. 
 
3.3  Measure for Real Activities Manipulation 
 Based on the model described in Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006), I 
estimate normal levels of production costs and adjusted discretionary expenses.8 To estimate 
normal production costs, I run the following industry-year regression:  
 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐷𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
  =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + 𝛼2
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + 𝛼3
𝛥𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
  + 𝛼4
𝛥𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 +  ɛ𝑖,𝑡                (3) 
  
 where PROD are the production costs defined as the sum of cost of goods sold and 
change in inventory. A denotes book value of total assets, while S indicates sales revenue. 
Abnormal production costs (AB_PROD) are defined as the difference between actual production 
                                                 
8 Consistent with Zang (2012), I do not examine abnormal cash flows from operations. This is because the current 
level of cash flow from operations ambiguously reflects real activities manipulation, as pointed out by Roychowdhury 
(2006). Some examples of real activities manipulation, such as overproduction and price discount all reduce cash 
flows from operations; however, the other examples of real activities manipulation, such as cutting discretionary 
expenditure, increase cash flows from operations (Roychowdhury 2006; Zang 2012). 
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and normal production costs. AB_PROD demonstrates a higher value as production costs 
become greater. 
 Next, normal levels of adjusted discretionary expenses are estimated using the following 
industry-year regression: 
 
         
𝐴𝐷𝐽_𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
  =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + 𝛼2
𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                (4) 
 
 where for firm i and year t, ADJ_DISEXP is adjusted discretionary expenses defined as 
the sum of advertising and R&D expenditures, which is calculated by subtracting the SG&A 
expenditure from discretionary expenses. In this context, the potential threat of discretionary 
expenses being mechanically related to the organization capital measure is reduced. Any missing 
values in advertising and R&D expenditures are converted to zero value. The definitions of other 
variables are described in Equation (3). Abnormal adjusted discretionary expenses (AB_ADX) 
are defined as residuals from Equation (4). Since AB_ADX demonstrates a lower value, as 
adjusted discretionary expenditure cut becomes greater, I multiply AB_ADX by a value of 
negative one and denote it as MINUS_AB_ADX. Thus, a higher value of MINUS_AB_ADX 
indicates greater amount of adjusted discretionary expenditure cuts.  
 For each industry-year regression, for inclusion in my analyses I require at least eight 
observations. To aggregate measures of real activities manipulation, I referenced the work of 
Zang (2012) and construct a comprehensive index of real activities manipulation. My index of 
real activities manipulation (RAM) is calculated by abnormal production costs minus abnormal 
adjusted discretionary expenses. RAM acquires a higher value as firms engage in more real 
activities manipulation. 
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3.4  Measure for Accrual-based Earnings Management 
 Consistent with works from Dechow et al. (1995), Cohen et al. (2008), and Chen et al. 
(2015), my paper utilizes discretionary accruals to measure accrual-based earnings management. 
Specifically, I estimate the normal level of discretionary accruals using the following Jones 
(1991) regression model modified by Dechow et al. (1995) for each industry-year grouping: 
 
 
𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
  =  𝜃0 +  𝜃1
1
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + 𝜃2
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + 𝜃3  
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡          (5) 
 
 where for firm i and year t, ACCR represents total accruals measured by earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations minus operating cash flows; A denotes total 
assets; ΔREV indicates change in revenues from the prior year; ΔAR is change in accounts 
receivable from the prior year; and PPE describes gross value of property, plant, and equipment. 
Each industry is classified by a two-digit SIC code. For each industry-year regression, for 
inclusion in my analyses I require at least eight observations. Discretionary accrual (DA) is 
defined as the difference between actual and normal accruals. Consistent with work in this field 
(Warfield et al. 1995; Klein 2002; Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Yu 2008; Chen et al. 2015), 
my baseline models use the absolute value of discretional accruals (ABS_DA) to proxy for 
accrual-based earnings management. 
 
3.5  Control Variables 
 In recent years, managerial short-termism has been studied by employing earnings 
management as a proxy for managerial short-termism (Graham et al. 2005; Cohen & Zarowin 
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2010; Chen et al. 2015). To understand managerial short-termism, it can be helpful to review a 
body of literature on factors for earnings management. In models of Dechow and Dichev (2002), 
Roychowdhury (2006), and Hribar and Nichols (2007), firm size, cash flows, volatility of cash 
flows, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and loss are associated with earnings management. 
Additionally, firm age, sales growth, volatility of sales growth, stock liquidity, Altman’s Z-
score, cumulative stock returns, and stock returns volatility can also be determinants of earnings 
management (Bergstresser & Philippon 2006; Demerjian et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2015). Taken 
together, a body of work demonstrates these variables factor into earnings management.  
 Based on data availability, first, I control for firm size (SIZE), cash flows (CF), volatility 
of cash flows (SQ_CF), market-to-book ratio (MB_RATIO), leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), and 
loss dummy (LOSS), which could be determinants of earnings management (Dechow & Dichev 
2002; Roychowdhury 2006; Hribar & Nichols 2007). An additional control variable is firm age 
(FIRM_AGE), which likely affects the volatility of a corporate operating environment 
(Bergstresser & Philippon 2006). Consistent with Chen et al. (2015) and Demerjian et al. 
(2013), I include sales growth (S_GROWTH), volatility of sales growth (SQ_S_GROWTH), 
Altman’s Z-score (AZ_SCORE), cumulative stock returns (CUM_RET), and stock returns 
volatility (STD_RET) into my analyses. 
 
4  Organization Capital and Earnings Management: Empirical Results 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1.1 provides descriptive statistics for earnings management proxies, organization 
capital, and other firm characteristics used in my analyses. For earnings management proxies, a 
29 
median sample firm has 0.001 in F1_AB_PROD, F1_MINUS_AB_DX of 0.008, F1_RAM of 
0.014 and F1_ABS_DA of 0.045. Median OC_TA_RATIO is 0.111.  
[Table 1.1 About Here] 
 
 Table 1.2 shows correlations between sample variables. The table shows the correlation 
coefficient between organization capital (OC_TA_RATIO) and subsequent real activities 
manipulation is significantly negative (−0.1845, F1_AB_PROD, −0.2240, F1_MINUS_AB_DX 
and −0.2304, F1_RAM), whereas organization capital and subsequent absolute value of 
discretionary accrual is significantly positively correlated (0.1960). These correlation 
coefficients agree with my hypotheses.  
[Table 1.2 About Here] 
 
 Table 1.3 reports mean values of organization capital and earnings management by 
industry. Industries are defined as the 10 Fama-French industry groups.9 Then, organization 
capital is averaged across each Fama-French industry group. In Panels A and B, industries are 
sorted based upon their average values of organization capital. In Panel A, the top two groups 
are high-techs (HiTec; 0.4395) and pharmaceuticals (Hlth; 0.3886), which heavily depends on 
information and human capital. The bottom two groups are utilities (Utils; 0.0369) and energies 
(Enrgy; 0.0920), which are capital-intensive industries. Panel B shows that high organization 
capital industries tend to have lower real activities manipulations (RAM) and higher accrual 
management (AM), which is consistent with my hypotheses. For example, the average RAM of 
                                                 
9  With respect to the industry definitions, please see Kenneth French’s Website at Dartmouth 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).   
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HiTec (-0.0358) is lower than that of Utils (0.0165). Conversely, the mean AM of HiTec 
(0.0846) is higher than that of Utils (0.0432).  
[Table 1.3 About Here] 
 
4.2  Impact of Organization Capital on Earnings Management 
 To test whether organization capital varies with earnings management, I use the 
following regressions: 
 
 𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑂𝐶_𝑇𝐴_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ɛi,t         (6) 
  
 where, for firm i and year t, EM is either a real activities manipulation measure 
(AB_PROD, MINUS_AB_DX or RAM) or an accrual-based management measure (ABS_DA); 
OC_TA_RATIO denotes organization capital scaled by total book value of assets; Controls 
include firm size (SIZE), cash flows (CF), volatility of cash flows (SQ_CF), market-to-book 
ratio (MB_RATIO), leverage ratio (LEVERAGE), loss dummy (LOSS), firm age (FIRM_AGE), 
sales growth (S_GROWTH), volatility of sales growth (SQ_S_GROWTH), Altman’s Z-score 
(AZ_SCORE), cumulative stock returns (CUM_RET), and stock returns volatility (STD_RET). 
The definitions of variables are described in Appendix A. To alleviate endogeneity problems due 
to simultaneity, all dependent variables are one year forward estimates. I also include year fixed 
effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (Industry) in my regressions. Standard errors are robust 
to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity. 
 The empirical results of estimating Equation (6) are presented in Table 1.4. Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) of Table 1.4 show a significantly negative relationship between organization capital 
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and subsequent real activities manipulation, supporting Hypothesis 1 indicating that greater 
organization capital discourages managerial short-termism in real operations. The coefficient of 
organization capital on subsequent accrual-based earnings management is significantly positive 
in Column (4), supporting Hypothesis 2 indicating that greater organization capital intensifies 
the myopic management through accruals. Overall, my baseline results suggest greater 
organization capital leads firms to switch from real activities manipulation to accrual-based 
earnings management, which is consistent with my hypotheses. 
[Table 1.4 About Here] 
 
5  Robustness Tests 
5.1  Alternative Measures of Organization Capital 
 The first concern is measurement error for organizational capital. SG&A expenditure 
does not capture all aspects of organizational capital because although SG&A expenditure 
includes organization capital related expenses such as employee training, it may not perfectly 
reflect some conceptual elements such as effectively matching employees to tasks. Additionally, 
parts of SG&A expenses do not directly contribute to organizational capital, including but not 
limited to managerial perks. To mitigate this measurement problem, I use the approach of Li et 
al. (2017) and annually assign each firm into decile groups based on their organizational capital 
level. This ranking system is used to replace the absolute value of organizational capital so that 
measurement error can be reduced.  
 Table 1.5 shows associations between annual decile rank of organization capital 
(OC_DECILE) and earnings management proxies. The empirical results show the coefficients of 
OC_DECILE on subsequent real activities manipulation remain negative and significant, 
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whereas the coefficient of OC_DECILE on subsequent accrual-based earnings management 
remains positive and significant. This suggests that my findings are robust to alternative measure 
of organization capital.   
[Table 1.5 About Here] 
 
 Different industries have different accounting practices for calculating SG&A 
expenditure, which naturally causes measurement error in organization capital. To alleviate 
measurement error issue induced by heterogeneity in industries, I use industry-median adjusted 
organizational capital (IND_ADJ_OC). Table 1.6 shows empirical results using IND_ADJ_OC 
are consistent with the baseline findings suggesting organization capital drives firms to switch 
from real activities manipulation to accrual-based earnings management. 
[Table 1.6 About Here] 
 
5.2  Subsample Analysis 
 Accrual-based earnings management compromises information quality in a financial 
statement; thus inducing higher cost of capital (Francis et al. 2004; Aboody et al. 2005; Francis 
et al. 2008; Kim & Qi 2010). The positive association between organization capital and 
subsequent accrual-based earnings management is problematic since this implies firms with 
greater organization capital could suffer from higher cost of capital in a subsequent period.  
 In 2002, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was introduced to promote the integrity of financial 
statements by strictly restraining accrual-based earnings management. To check if the positive 
association between organization capital and subsequent accrual-based earnings management is 
attenuated after the passage of SOX, I undertake subsample analyses for the pre-SOX (Year 
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1987 – 2001) and post-SOX (Year 2002 – 2016) periods. Panels A and B of Table 1.7 reports 
that the positive coefficient of organization capital on subsequent accrual-based earnings 
management is significant only during pre-SOX periods. Furthermore, Panel C shows that the 
coefficient of intersection between OC_TA_RATIO and SOX on accrual-based earnings 
management (ABS_DA) is significantly negative, implying that the introduction of SOX could 
reduce the positive relation between organization capital and accrual-based earnings 
management. This finding demonstrates evidence that the introduction of SOX could attenuate 
the problematic influence of organization capital on managerial short-termism through accruals.  
[Table 1.7 About Here] 
 
5.3  Endogeneity Concerns 
 My analyses so far leave questions on potential endogeneity possibilities: reverse 
causality, and omitted variable problems. The first concern is that managers who have less 
degree of short-termism could invest more in organization capital. Second, my results could be 
confounded by unobservable or omitted variable differences between high and low organization 
capital firms if the managerial short-termism is significantly affected by a change in these 
unobservable or omitted variables.  
 To alleviate the potential endogeneity concerns, I use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
test adopting the initial value of SG&A expenditure as an instrumental variable. Since the 
beginning value of organization capital of a firm is measured by converting its initial value of 
SG&A expenditure to an intangible asset (by perpetual inventory method), the initial value of 
SG&A expenditure can be sufficiently correlated with organization capital. This relevance 
condition is supported by the first-stage regression result reported in Column (1) of Table 1.8. 
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This column shows that initial SG&A expenditure is a significantly positive determinant of a 
firm’s organization capital. 
 In my baseline model, I exclude SG&A expenditure from earnings management measures 
that are used as proxies for managerial short-termism. Furthermore, the initial value of SG&A 
expenditure is unlikely to be correlated with future random shocks to earnings management 
measures. In this context, using the initial value of SG&A as an instrumental variable can 
mitigate endogeneity concerns of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The second-stage 
regression results reported in Columns (2), (3), (4), and (5) of Table 1.8 show that the 
instrumented value of OC_TA_RATIO is negatively and significantly associated with real 
activities manipulation measures, whereas the instrumented value of OC_TA_RATIO is 
positively and significantly associated with accrual-based earnings management measure, which 
is consistent with my predictions. 
[Table 1.8 About Here] 
 
 I further conduct Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) change regressions to address 
endogeneity issues such as time-invariant omitted variable problems. OLS change regressions 
use the year-to-year changes in dependent and independent variables. This method results in a 
better explanation of the incremental effects of organization capital on earnings management 
after alleviating the effects of time-invariant omitted variables. To estimate OLS change 
regressions, I run the following model: 
 
 𝛥𝐸𝑀𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝛥𝑂𝐶_𝑇𝐴_𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ɛi,t       (7) 
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 where, for firm i, ΔEM is either a change in real activities manipulation measure 
(ΔAB_PROD, ΔMINUS_AB_DX or ΔRAM) or a change in accrual-based management measure 
(ΔABS_DA) in year t+1 from the previous year; ΔOC_TA_RATIO denotes a change in 
organization capital scaled by total book value of assets in year t from previous year t-1; 
ΔControls include control variables which are described in Appendix A and all variables are first 
differences between year t and t-1. Year fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (Industry) 
are included in my regressions. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and 
heteroscedasticity. 
 Table 1.9 reports the results of the pooled OLS change regressions. In Columns (1), (2), 
and (3), I find that the coefficients of change in organization capital are negative and significant 
for subsequent changes in real activities manipulation. In column (4), the coefficient of change 
in organization capital on subsequent change in accrual-based earnings management is positive 
and significant. These results offer additional support to my arguments that organization capital 
encourages long-term management in real operations whereas it can intensify short-term 
pressure on managers by firm outsiders.  
[Table 1.9 About Here] 
 
5.4  Difference-in-Differences Approach 
 To address the endogeneity concerns which are mentioned in Section 5.2, I also utilize 
the difference-in-differences (DID) methodology to examine the impact of a change in 
organization capital on managerial short-termism. Following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), I 
use a technology shock as an exogeneous shock to organization capital. Schilling (2016) suggests 
that technological collaborations can identify technology shocks. This is because pooling scarce 
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resources through technological alliances is regarded as one of quickest and most effective 
reactions to a technology shock (Kogut 1991; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven 1996; Schilling & 
Steensma 2001). As demonstrated in Schilling (2016): Technology Shocks, Technological 
Collaboration, and Innovation Outcomes’s graph, Figure 1.2 visualizes a dramatic rise in 
technological collaborations during a period 1991 to 1995. Schilling (2016) attributes this rise to 
the major technology shock in information technology.10 Taken together, technology shock 
during years between 1991 and 1995 directly affects organization capital. In addition, the 
technology shock is unlikely to be directly associated with overproduction or accrual 
management. Therefore, an analysis of the change in overproduction or accrual management 
following the change in organization capital due to the technology shock in the early to mid-
1990s sets out a quasi-natural experiment to test the causal effect of organization capital on 
managerial short-termism.  
[Figure 1.2 about here] 
 
 I first measure the change in organization capital from the pre-shock year (1990) to the 
post-shock year (1996). Based on the change in organization capital around this period, I sort 
firms with available data into three equal groups. The top group represents firms with greater 
increase in organization capital whereas the other two groups represent firms with lower 
improvement in organization capital or decrease in organization capital.  
 Next, I create the treatment dummy (Treatment) which is equal to one if an observation 
belongs to the top group and zero otherwise. I calculate propensity scores by conducting a probit 
                                                 
10 For Example, Yahoo!, which is a representative web services provider in the early Internet era, was originally 
founded in January 1994.   
37 
regression of Treatment on all control variables from the baseline regression model in equation 
(6). Column (1) of Panel A in Table 1.10 shows that some control variables significantly affect 
the amount of variation in Treatment. To ensure that my results are not driven by the differences 
in these control variables, I match each firm in the top group (treatment firms) to a firm from the 
other two groups (control firms) with the closest propensity score. If any control firm is matched 
with multiple treatment firms, I keep one pair with the closest propensity score. As a result, 326 
unique pairs are identified.     
[Table 1.10 about here] 
 
 In Column (2) of Panel A in Table 1.10, all independent variables in a probit regression 
are statistically insignificant. Panel B of Table 1.10 also presents that the differences between 
the treatment and control firms’ characteristics become largely reduced by the propensity score 
matching procedures. That is, through the propensity score matching procedures, the treatment 
and control groups have similar levels of firm characteristics. Overall, Panels A and B support 
the interpretation that the changes in overproduction and accrual management are mainly caused 
by the exogeneous change in organization capital due to the technology shock. 
 Panel C of Table 1.10 reports the DID test results. The drop in overproduction 
(AB_PROD) is larger for the treatment firms than for the control firms as the mean DID 
estimator of AB_PROD is significantly negative. Additionally, the treatment firms experience a 
significantly greater increase in accrual management (ABS_DA) relative to the control firms. 
Considering that the treatment firms experience a greater increase in organization capital due to 
the technology shock, the results in Table 1.10 suggest a causal effect from organization capital 
to managerial short-termism. 
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5.5  Using Investment Component of Main SG&A Expenditure 
 Enache and Srivastava (2017) define Main SG&A as the amount of SG&A expenditure 
exceeding the sum of advertising and R&D expenditures. They decompose Main SG&A into 
two components: a maintenance portion of Main SG&A and an investment portion of Main 
SG&A. Of particular importance is that the investment portion of Main SG&A is more strongly 
related to organization capital.  
 To attempt to increase the validity of my empirical results, in Equation (1), I first replace 
SG&A expenditure with the investment portion of Main SG&A.11 Hence, the Equation (1) is 
modified as the following: 
 
       𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑂𝐶0 = 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑆𝐺𝐴1
𝑔+𝛿0
                              (8) 
 
 where INV_OC0 is the initial state of organization capital using the investment portion of 
Main SG&A, INV_SGA1 represents the investment portion of Main SG&A expenditure at time 
1. The definitions of g and δ0 are described in Equation (1).   
 After the initial state of organization capital using the investment portion of Main SG&A 
is determined, I estimate values of organization capital at later states following the same 
methodology used in Equation (2). Table 1.11 describes associations between organization 
capital using the investment portion of Main SG&A (INV_OC) and earnings management 
measures. Columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 1.11 present significant and negative relations 
                                                 
11 More details on the investment portion of Main SG&A is explained in Section 5.1 of Essay 2. 
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between INV_OC and proxies for subsequent real activities manipulation. Column (4) of Table 
1.11 illustrates a significant and positive relation between INV_OC and subsequent accrual-
based earnings management. These empirical results suggest that my hypotheses are robust to 
the organization capital using the investment portion of Main SG&A.  
[Table 1.11 About Here] 
 
5.6  Industry Concentration and Corporate Governance 
 Industry market structure is a potential factor that might affect the role of organization 
capital. Considering that organization capital can create synergies and improve efficiency of its 
overall system (Li et al. 2017), organization capital could enhance comparative advantage and 
economic rent. Firms in concentrated industries (e.g. monopolists or oligopolists), however, 
already enjoy high economic rent and thus the role of organization capital becomes less 
important. For example, Hou and Robinson (2006) argue that companies in concentered 
industries have less incentive to innovate, and thus they have lower average stock returns. 
Therefore, I expect that organization capital plays a less important role in concentrated 
industries. In contrast, the impact of organization capital would be amplified for firms with 
competitive industries.  
 Another possible explanation is that increased industry competitiveness can represent 
better external corporate governance, which leads managers to pursue the utilization of corporate 
resources in more efficient ways. In this view, organization capital plays a more important role 
in competitive industries.      
 I measure industry concentration by using Herfindahl Index (HI). A higher HI indicates a 
higher industry concentration. In Table 1.12, the key variable of interest is the intersection 
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between organization capital and Herfindahl Index (OC_TA_RATIO × HI), which captures the 
effect of industry concentration on the sensitivity of earnings management to organization 
capital. I find that the effect of OC_TA_RATIO × HI on subsequent accrual-based earnings 
management is negative but insignificant. OC_TA_RATIO × HI, however, has positive and 
significant coefficients when the dependent variables are proxies for subsequent real activities 
manipulation. Thus, the negative relation between organization capital and real activities 
manipulation is weaker as firms belong to concentrated industries. In other words, the negative 
impact of organization capital on real activities manipulation is stronger for firms with 
competitive industries. These findings are two sides of the same coin and consistent with my 
expectations.      
[Table 1.12 About Here] 
 
 Corporate governance can significantly affect managerial short-termism. Specifically, 
investor horizon could be an important dimension which can drive the level of managerial short-
termism. For instance, Cremers et al. (2017) show that firms with short-term investors, such as 
hedge funds, tend to spend lower R&D expenditures. On the other hand, long-term shareholders, 
such as pension and mutual funds, improve firms’ innovation in quantity and quality (Harford et 
al. 2017) as well as long-term performance (Appel et al. 2016). In addition, higher institutional 
ownership, which may foster long-term management, is related to lower information asymmetry 
(Boone & White 2015).  
 According to Harford et al. (2017), a long-term investor horizon is associated with lower  
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GIM (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003) governance index.12 By following Harford et al. 
(2017)’s finding, I use GIM governance index to control investor horizon in my robustness test. 
 
  In Table 1.13, I add GIM to my baseline regression model as an additional control 
variable. After merging GIM data with my baseline data, I use observations with sufficient data 
to run my revised regression model. As a result of the discrepancy between the data sets, the 
total remaining number of observations is 4,094. Table 1.13 describes that there is a significant 
and positive relation between GIM and subsequent RAM, implying that firms with short-term 
investor horizon tend to engage in more real activities manipulations. Returning to my 
hypotheses, the results in Table 1.13 show that the coefficients of organization capital remain to 
be significantly negative, even after controlling investor horizon.     
[Table 1.13 About Here] 
 
5.7  Idiosyncratic Risk 
 The volatility of cash flows is likely to affect earnings management (Dechow & Dichev 
2002; Roychowdhury 2006; Hribar & Nichols 2007). Considering that idiosyncratic risk mirrors 
the volatility of cash flows (Irvine & Pontiff 2009), it is a good alternative to the cash flow 
volatility. Table 1.14 reports the results by replacing cash flow volatility (SQ_CF) with 
idiosyncratic risk (IVOL) in my baseline model. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show that the greater 
the organization capital is, the significantly weaker the real activities manipulation is. In column 
(4), subsequent accrual-based earnings management is significantly stronger when organization 
                                                 
12  GIM governance index data for years 1990-2006 is downloadable at Andrew Metrick’s Website: 
http://faculty.som.yale.edu/andrewmetrick/data.html  
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capital becomes greater. These results provide additional support to my hypotheses by using 
idiosyncratic risk as an alternative measure of the volatility of cash flows. 
[Table 1.14 About Here] 
 
5.8  Managerial Ability and Employee Satisfaction 
 Demerjian et al. (2012) develop managerial ability score constructed by estimating firm 
efficiency attributing to the management team. The managerial ability score is positively 
associated with organization capital (Li et al. 2017). Hence, I use managerial ability score 
(MA_SCORE) as an independent variable in my baseline regressions.13 Unlike organization 
capital measure, the managerial ability score from Demerjian et al. (2012) is not heavily 
dependent on SG&A expenditure, which can reduce the concern that dependent and independent 
variables are not mutually exclusive in my empirical investigations. In Columns (1), (2), and (3) 
of Table 1.15, the real activities manipulation proxies are significantly weaker for firms with 
better managerial ability. Column (4) shows the positive and significant associations between 
managerial ability and accrual-based earnings management. Summing up, my hypotheses are 
maintained using the managerial ability score, which reduces the concern that dependent and 
independent variables may not be mutually exclusive. 
[Table 1.15 About Here] 
 
 To supplement the test in Table 1.15 addressing the concern that organization capital and 
real activities manipulation might not be mutually exclusive, I also replace organization capital 
                                                 
13  Managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012) is downloadable at the following link: 
http://faculty.washington.edu/pdemerj/data.html  
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with employee satisfaction in my empirical investigations.14 Following Edmans (2011) and Li et 
al. (2017), I utilize Fortune magazine’s “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” list to 
construct a measure of employee satisfaction. Specifically, for each year, I construct a firm’s 
employee satisfaction variable (BEST_FOR_WORK), which is equal to 1 if a firm is included in 
the Fortune magazine’s “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” list, 0 otherwise. 
Because the Fortune magazine’s list is available in 1984, 1993, and 1998–2016, there is a 
serious discontinuity in the pre-SOX period (Years 1987–2001). Therefore, I conduct my 
empirical test using the post-SOX period (Years 2002–2016) only. Columns (1), (2), and (3) of 
Table 1.16 show that the coefficients of BEST_FOR_WORK are significantly negative when real 
activities manipulation proxies are dependent variables. In Column (4), there is no significant 
association between BEST_FOR_WORK and accrual-based earnings management. These results 
are consistent with my findings in Table 1.7. 
[Table 1.16 About Here] 
 
6  Conclusion 
 After the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, on average, firms engage in 
more real activities manipulation whereas they engage in less accrual-based earnings 
management (Cohen et al. 2008). Considering that real activities manipulation has a directly 
negative impact on corporate future cash flows whereas accrual-based earnings management 
does not, real activities manipulation can be more detrimental to firm values than accrual-based 
earnings management can (Cohen & Zarowin 2010). This evidence naturally raises the important 
                                                 
14 Firms with higher organization capital tend to have higher employee satisfaction (Li et al. 2017).  
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question of how myopic management of real operations can be mitigated, especially in the post-
SOX period. 
 This paper contributes to a discussion on this problematic issue by examining how 
organization capital affects managerial short-termism. My study seeks to resolve prior 
literature’s competing views on the relation between organization capital and managerial short-
termism. Specifically, I split managerial short-termism into two broad categories: (1) managerial 
short-termism in real operations, and (2) managerial short-termism through accruals. I then focus 
on the impact of organization capital on each category of managerial short-termism.  
 By employing earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism (Graham et 
al. 2005; Cohen & Zarowin 2010; Chen et al. 2015), I find that an investment in organization 
capital leads firms to switch from real activities manipulation to accrual-based earnings 
management. These findings offer empirical evidence for the following arguments: (1) greater 
organization capital internally discourages the myopic management of real operations and (2) 
greater organization capital intensifies myopic management through accruals in an external 
dimension. My hypotheses remain supported even after controlling a proxy for corporate 
governance. These relations are robust to using alternative measures of organization capital and 
employing a two-stage least squares (2SLS) test and change regressions. I then employ a 
difference-in-difference (DID) methodology and exploiting the variation in organization capital 
generated by exogenous technology shock. I observe that my hypotheses continue to hold in the 
DID approach. 
 Furthermore, after the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the positive 
association between organization capital and subsequent accrual-based earnings management 
becomes significantly reduced, supporting the possibility that SOX could attenuate the 
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problematic influence of organization capital on accruals. To investigate the effect of industry 
concentration, I find that the negative impact of organization capital on real activities 
manipulation is stronger for firms with competitive industries. By providing a managerial short-
termism channel, my paper attempts to facilitate future research on the impact of organization 
capital on various corporate outcomes. 
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Table 1.1 Univariate Statistics for Sample Firms 
 
Notes:  
Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for variables in this study. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The sample consists of 73,759 firm-year observations from January of 1987 through December of 2016. 
The definitions of variables are described in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Number of obs = 73,759     
Variable 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Std. Dev 
F1_AB_PROD -0.106 -0.003 0.000 0.100 0.202 
F1_MINUS_AB_ADX -0.013 0.002 0.008 0.042 0.077 
F1_RAM -0.112 0.000 0.013 0.129 0.235 
F1_ABS_DA 0.020 0.070 0.045 0.089 0.079 
OC_TA_RATIO 0.025 0.315 0.105 0.356 0.558 
SIZE 4.003 5.527 5.502 7.027 2.213 
CF 0.025 0.039 0.079 0.125 0.194 
SQ_CF 0.012 0.059 0.027 0.062 0.098 
MB_RATIO 0.798 1.618 1.152 1.846 1.473 
LEVERAGE 0.027 0.211 0.178 0.328 0.199 
LOSS 0.000 0.297 0.000 1.000 0.457 
FIRM_AGE 8.000 18.548 14.000 26.000 13.425 
S_GROWTH -0.025 0.089 0.076 0.192 0.296 
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.050 0.175 0.103 0.206 0.223 
AZ_SCORE 0.859 1.321 1.835 2.673 2.838 
CUM_RET -0.225 0.171 0.059 0.384 0.661 
STD_RET 0.090 0.146 0.127 0.179 0.082 
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Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
F1_ 
AB_ 
PROD 
F1_ 
MINUS
_AB_ 
ADX 
F1_ 
RAM 
F1_ 
ABS_ 
DA 
OC_TA
_RATIO 
SIZE CF SQ_CF 
MB_ 
RATIO 
LEVER
AGE 
LOSS 
FIRM_
AGE 
S_ 
GROW
TH 
SQ_ 
S_GRO
WTH 
AZ_ 
SCORE 
CUM_ 
RET 
STD_ 
RET 
F1_AB_PROD 1.0000                  
F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX 0.2803 1.0000                 
F1_RAM 0.9512 0.5520 1.0000                
F1_ABS_DA 0.0383 -0.1254 -0.0053 1.0000               
OC_TA_RATIO -0.1782 -0.2236 -0.2243 0.1949 1.0000              
SIZE 0.0098 0.0656 0.0257 -0.2992 -0.3258 1.0000             
CF -0.1281 0.1926 -0.0564 -0.2686 -0.3337 0.3666 1.0000            
SQ_CF -0.0251 -0.1903 -0.0784 0.2509 0.3315 -0.3415 -0.3822  1.0000           
MB_RATIO -0.2159 -0.2402 -0.2571 0.1314 0.0935 -0.1325 -0.0696  0.2033 1.0000          
LEVERAGE 0.1042 0.1203 0.1280 -0.0378 -0.0731 0.1626 -0.0680  -0.0476 -0.1584 1.0000         
LOSS 0.0722 -0.1148 0.0277 0.2065 0.2264 -0.3443 -0.6043  0.2949 -0.0215 0.1006 1.0000        
FIRM_AGE 0.0481 0.1092 0.0756 -0.1787 -0.2799 0.4160 0.1575  -0.1918 -0.1197 0.0328 -0.1877 1.0000       
S_GROWTH -0.0377 -0.0266 -0.0415 0.0262 -0.0959 0.0340 0.1553  0.0178 0.1830 -0.0001 -0.1674 -0.1055 1.0000      
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0744 -0.0767 0.0430 0.1856 0.1654 -0.3328 -0.3207  0.3832 0.1116 -0.0007 0.2721 -0.1925 0.1149 1.0000     
AZ_SCORE -0.0275 0.2118 0.0362 -0.2547 -0.3330 0.3881 0.6967  -0.5120 -0.1870 -0.0766 -0.4687 0.1821 0.0753 -0.3790  1.0000    
CUM_RET -0.0479 -0.0315 -0.0512 0.0140 -0.0245 0.0002 0.1659  0.0273 0.2886 -0.0637 -0.1673 -0.0225 0.1694 0.0026 0.0658 1.0000   
STD_RET 0.0113 -0.1146 -0.0246 0.2637 0.3049 -0.4396 -0.3512 0.4268 0.0902 -0.0069 0.3546 -0.3378 0.0062 0.3291 -0.3728 0.1455 1.0000 
 
Notes:  
All correlations that are significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed, are bolded. The definitions of variables are described in Appendix A. 
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Table 1.3 Organization Capital by Industry 
Panel A: Organization Capital by Fama-French 10 industry Groups                                        Number of obs = 73,759 
FF Industry Name Description 
Mean 
Organization 
Capital 
Obs. 
5 HiTec 
Business Equipment (Computers, Software, and 
Electronic Equipment) 
0.4395 18,196 
8 Hlth Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 0.3886 7,951 
7 Shops 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, 
Repair Shops) 
0.3756 8,983 
1 NoDur 
Consumer NonDurables (Food, Tobacco, Textiles, 
Apparel, Leather, Toys) 
0.2932 5,178 
6 Telcm Telephone and Television Transmission 0.2828 2,101 
2 Durbl 
Consumer Durables (Cars, TV's, Furniture, 
Household Appliances) 
0.2649 2,621 
10 Other 
Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, 
Entertainment, Finance 
0.2499 10,872 
3 Manuf 
Manufacturing (Machinery, Trucks, Planes, 
Chemicals, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing) 
0.2119 13,844 
4 Enrgy Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 0.0920 3,802 
9 Utils Utilities 0.0369 211 
 
Panel B: Earnings Management by Fama-French 10 industry Groups                                      Number of obs = 73,759 
FF Industry Name Description 
Mean 
Real Activities 
Manipulation 
(RAM) 
Mean 
Accrual 
Management 
(AM) 
5 HiTec 
Business Equipment (Computers, Software, and 
Electronic Equipment) 
-0.0358 0.0846 
8 Hlth Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs -0.0486 0.0848 
7 Shops 
Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, 
Repair Shops) 
-0.0008 0.0609 
1 NoDur 
Consumer NonDurables (Food, Tobacco, Textiles, 
Apparel, Leather, Toys) 
-0.0127 0.0566 
6 Telcm Telephone and Television Transmission -0.0056 0.0698 
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Notes:  
Table 1.3 reports mean values of organization capital and earnings management by industry. Industries are defined as 
the 10 Fama-French industry groups. In Panels A and B, industries are sorted based upon their mean values of 
organization capital. The sample consists of 73,759 firm-year observations from January of 1987 through December 
of 2016. The definitions of variables are described in Appendix A. 
 
  
2 Durbl 
Consumer Durables (Cars, TV's, Furniture, 
Household Appliances) 
0.0076 0.0642 
10 Other 
Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, 
Entertainment, Finance 
0.0373 0.0694 
3 Manuf 
Manufacturing (Machinery, Trucks, Planes, 
Chemicals, Off Furn, Paper, Com Printing) 
0.0493 0.0555 
4 Enrgy Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products -0.0058 0.0702 
9 Utils Utilities 0.0165 0.0432 
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Table 1.4 Organization Capital and Earnings Management 
This table reports the results of the pooled OLS regressions of earnings management on organization capital. All 
dependent variables are measured one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies 
are dependent variables. In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The 
independent variable of interest is OC_TA_RATIO defined as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. 
The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January 
of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO -0.0966 -0.0215 -0.1194 0.0040 
 (-21.527)*** (-11.004)*** (-22.394)*** (3.930)*** 
     
SIZE 0.0012 -0.0051 -0.0039 -0.0048 
 (0.996) (-11.375)*** (-2.701)** (-20.942)*** 
     
CF -0.2551 0.0369 -0.2280 -0.0507 
 (-18.773)*** (6.695)*** (-14.576)*** (-13.309)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0061 -0.0497 -0.0550 0.0584 
 (-0.350) (-5.986)*** (-2.542)*** (9.837)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0321 -0.0115 -0.0429 0.0031 
 (-21.675)*** (-16.642)*** (-24.478)*** (9.540)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0546 0.0616 0.1151             -0.0008 
 (5.774)*** (16.455)*** (10.414)***            (-0.383) 
     
LOSS -0.0142 -0.0071 -0.0231 0.0025 
 (-4.746)*** (-5.783)*** (-6.685)*** (2.577)** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (1.217) (6.260)*** (2.846)*** (-3.301)*** 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0091 -0.0076 -0.0171 0.0077 
 (-2.624)*** (-5.618)*** (-4.379)*** (5.348)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0812 0.0141 0.0956 0.0041 
 (11.990)*** (4.811)*** (12.762)*** (1.888)* 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0020 0.0028 0.0044 -0.0003 
 (1.596) (5.445)*** (2.919)** (-1.205) 
     
CUM_RET 0.0132 0.0013 0.0145 0.0006 
 (9.752)*** (2.414)** (9.363)***              (1.032) 
     
STD_RET 0.0589 -0.0238 0.0357 0.0926 
 (2.808)*** (-2.886)** (1.451) (15.052)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 73,759    73,759   73,759   73,759   
adj. R-sq 0.139 0.167 0.162 0.167 
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Table 1.5 Annual Decile Rank of Organization Capital 
This table reports the robustness test results by using annual decile rank of organization capital. All dependent 
variables are measured one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies are dependent 
variables.  In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The independent 
variable of interest is OC_DECILE defined as annual decile rank based on the level of OC_TA_RATIO. The definitions 
of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through 
December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 
are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ 
AB_ADX 
F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_DECILE -0.0187 -0.0046 -0.0236 0.0008 
 (-23.066)*** (-14.439)*** (-25.661)*** (4.958)*** 
     
SIZE -0.0013 -0.0057 -0.0071 -0.0047 
 (-1.042) (-12.806)*** (-4.990)*** (-20.323)*** 
     
CF -0.2349 0.0412 -0.2033 -0.0515 
 (-17.672)*** (7.627)*** (-13.401)*** (-13.609)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0299 -0.0536 -0.0830 0.0594 
 (-1.758)* (-6.588)*** (-3.997)*** (10.013)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0332 -0.0118 -0.0443 0.0031 
 (-22.212)*** (-17.104)*** (-25.115)*** (9.706)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0562 0.0615 0.1165 -0.0009 
 (5.886)*** (16.635)*** (10.503)*** (-0.421) 
     
LOSS -0.0062 -0.0052 -0.0131 0.0022 
 (-2.074)** (-4.299)*** (-3.822)*** (2.230)** 
     
FIRM_AGE -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-2.718)*** (2.931)*** (-1.568) (-2.136)** 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0098 -0.0082 -0.0185 0.0078 
 (-2.895)*** (-6.046)*** (-4.822)*** (5.341)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0731 0.0120 0.0852 0.0045 
 (10.940)*** (4.127)*** (11.607)*** (2.048)** 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0055 0.0036 0.0087 -0.0005 
 (4.587)*** (7.159)*** (6.063)*** (-1.756)* 
     
CUM_RET 0.0141 0.0015 0.0156 0.0005 
 (10.329)*** (2.792)*** (9.984)*** (0.965) 
     
STD_RET 0.0403 -0.0266 0.0141 0.0934 
 (1.916)* (-3.188)*** (0.569) (15.108)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 73,759   73,759   73,759   73,759   
adj. R-sq 0.139 0.170 0.163 0.167 
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Table 1.6 Industry-Median Adjusted Organization Capital 
This table reports the robustness test results by using industry-median adjusted organization capital. All dependent 
variables are measured one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies are dependent 
variables.  In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The independent 
variable of interest is IND_ADJ_OC defined as organization capital minus industry-median organization capital in the 
Fama-French 10 industry classification scheme. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The 
sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables 
are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and 
heteroscedasticity.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ 
AB_ADX 
F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
IND_ADJ_OC -0.0936 -0.0199 -0.1149 0.0039 
 (-20.800)*** (-10.113)*** (-21.498)*** (3.746)*** 
     
SIZE 0.0011 -0.0051 -0.0040 -0.0048 
 (0.913) (-11.378)*** (-2.770)*** (-20.915)*** 
     
CF -0.2541 0.0374 -0.2266 -0.0507 
 (-18.694)*** (6.795)*** (-14.482)*** (-13.324)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0097 -0.0512 -0.0600 0.0586 
 (-0.555) (-6.172)*** (-2.779)*** (9.870)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0322 -0.0116 -0.0430 0.0031 
 (-21.699)*** (-16.671)*** (-24.489)*** (9.552)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0563 0.0622 0.1173 -0.0009 
 (5.941)*** (16.580)*** (10.589)*** (-0.422) 
     
LOSS -0.0142 -0.0071 -0.0231 0.0025 
 (-4.739)*** (-5.767)*** (-6.665)*** (2.576)** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0001 
 (1.464) (6.501)*** (3.129)*** (-3.380)*** 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0085 -0.0073 -0.0163 0.0077 
 (-2.448)** (-5.402)*** (-4.147)*** (5.324)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0815 0.0142 0.0961 0.0041 
 (12.038)*** (4.862)*** (12.820)*** (1.880)* 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0021 0.0029 0.0046 -0.0003 
 (1.703)* (5.569)*** (3.049)*** (-1.233) 
     
CUM_RET 0.0133 0.0013 0.0147 0.0006 
 (9.866)*** (2.489)** (9.484)*** (1.019) 
     
STD_RET 0.0517 -0.0261 0.0263 0.0930 
 (2.465)** (-3.150)*** (1.065) (15.104)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 73,759   73,759   73,759   73,759   
adj. R-sq 0.137 0.165 0.158 0.167 
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Table 1.7 Pre- and Post- SOX periods 
This table reports the robustness test results for the pre-SOX (Year 1987 – 2001) and post-SOX (Year 2002 – 2016) 
periods. All dependent variables are measured one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities 
management proxies are dependent variables. In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a 
dependent variable. The independent variable of interest is OC_TA_RATIO defined as organization capital divided by 
total book value of assets. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year 
observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 
both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity. 
 
Panel A: Pre-SOX Periods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO 
-0.1117 -0.0251 -0.1378 0.0043 
(-19.938)*** (-11.254)*** (-20.793)*** (3.311)*** 
     
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 38,271   38,271   38,271   38,271   
adj. R-sq 0.145 0.158 0.167 0.171   
 
Variable 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Std. Dev 
F1_AB_PROD -0.112 -0.004 0.001 0.108 0.212 
F1_MINUS_AB_ADX -0.013 0.003 0.009 0.042 0.078 
F1_RAM -0.118 -0.001 0.014 0.137 0.246 
F1_ABS_DA 0.022 0.077 0.050 0.100 0.083 
OC_TA_RATIO 0.068 0.402 0.198 0.492 0.581 
SIZE 3.575 5.027 4.982 6.421 2.132 
CF 0.027 0.042 0.081 0.128 0.191 
SQ_CF 0.012 0.055 0.026 0.059 0.090 
MB_RATIO 0.772 1.605 1.095 1.775 1.563 
LEVERAGE 0.052 0.228 0.202 0.348 0.198 
LOSS 0.000 0.292 0.000 1.000 0.455 
FIRM_AGE 7.000 16.772 12.000 25.000 12.246 
S_GROWTH -0.021 0.101 0.082 0.207 0.310 
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.050 0.176 0.102 0.204 0.230 
AZ_SCORE 1.116 1.654 2.019 2.803 2.320 
CUM_RET -0.244 0.164 0.040 0.374 0.674 
STD_RET 0.093 0.151 0.132 0.185 0.084 
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Panel B: Post-SOX Periods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO 
-0.0780 -0.0173 -0.0972 0.0024 
(-19.938)*** (-5.699)*** (-12.388)*** (1.488) 
     
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 35,488 35,488 35,488 35,488 
adj. R-sq 0.140 0.188 0.165 0.160 
 
Panel C: Interaction Term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO -0.1054 -0.0218 -0.1280 0.0071 
 (-20.053)*** (-10.500)*** (-20.607)*** (5.878)*** 
     
OC_TA_RATIO × SOX 0.0219 -0.0009 0.0214 -0.0076 
 (3.247)*** (0.289) (2.569)** (-4.239)*** 
     
SIZE 0.0011 -0.0051 -0.0041 -0.0047 
 (0.864) (-11.380)*** (-2.811)*** (-20.710)*** 
     
Variable 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Std. Dev 
F1_AB_PROD -0.101 -0.003 0.000 0.091 0.190 
F1_MINUS_AB_ADX -0.014 0.002 0.006 0.042 0.076 
F1_RAM -0.105 0.000 0.011 0.121 0.223 
F1_ABS_DA 0.018 0.063 0.040 0.077 0.074 
OC_TA_RATIO 0.011 0.221 0.040 0.178 0.515 
SIZE 4.577 6.067 6.102 7.547 2.171 
CF 0.022 0.035 0.077 0.122 0.197 
SQ_CF 0.012 0.063 0.027 0.066 0.106 
MB_RATIO 0.832 1.632 1.216 1.917 1.370 
LEVERAGE 0.006 0.192 0.152 0.303 0.198 
LOSS 0.000 0.303 0.000 1.000 0.460 
FIRM_AGE 10.000 20.462 16.000 27.000 14.346 
S_GROWTH -0.029 0.075 0.070 0.177 0.280 
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.051 0.174 0.105 0.208 0.215 
AZ_SCORE 0.616 0.962 1.621 2.494 3.269 
CUM_RET -0.205 0.179 0.077 0.393 0.646 
STD_RET 0.086 0.141 0.121 0.172 0.081 
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CF -0.2591 0.0368 -0.2319 -0.0493 
 (-18.981)*** (6.659)*** (-14.772)*** (-12.927)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0077 -0.0497 -0.0565 0.0590 
 (-0.444) (-5.998)*** (-2.625)*** (9.929)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0320 -0.0115 -0.0427 0.0030 
 (-21.564)*** (-16.635)*** (-24.396)*** (9.361)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0557 0.0617 0.1161 -0.0012 
 (5.888)*** (16.403)*** (10.502)*** (-0.563) 
     
LOSS -0.0144 -0.0071 -0.0233 0.0026 
 (-4.807)*** (-5.793)*** (-6.734)*** (2.641)*** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0002 0.0004 0.0006 -0.0001 
 (1.405) (6.280)*** (3.002)*** (-3.711)*** 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0099 -0.0076 -0.0179 0.0080 
 (-2.846)** (-5.647)*** (-4.565)*** (5.538)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0812 0.0141 0.0956 0.0041 
 (12.013)*** (4.813)*** (12.781)*** (1.879)* 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0026 0.0028 0.0050 -0.0005 
 (2.063)** (5.357)*** (3.294)*** (-1.969)** 
     
CUM_RET 0.0129 0.0013 0.0142 0.0007 
 (9.560)*** (2.392)** (9.198)*** (1.197) 
     
STD_RET 0.0624 -0.0237 0.0392 0.0914 
 (2.972)*** (-2.869)*** (1.588) (14.822)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 73,759   73,759   73,759   73,759   
adj. R-sq 0.140 0.167 0.163 0.167 
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Table 1.8 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis 
This table reports the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression results to address endogeneity concerns. All dependent 
variables are measured one year forward. The first stage regression result is reported in Column (1). In the first stage 
regressions, the instrumental variable of organization capital is the initial value of SG&A expenditures scaled by total 
book value of assets. In Columns (2) (3) and (4), real activities management proxies are dependent variables in the 
second stage regressions. In Column (5), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable in the 
second stage regression. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year 
observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 
both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable OC_TA_RATIO F1_AB_PROD 
F1_MINUS_ 
AB_ADX 
F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
IV: Initial SG&A 0.9181     
 (5.817)***     
      
Fitted OC_TA_RATIO  -0.1073 -0.0260 -0.1333 0.0062 
  (-14.069)*** (-6.768)*** (-13.610)*** (3.183)*** 
      
SIZE 0.0134 0.0012 -0.0051 -0.0040 -0.0048 
 (4.386)*** (0.966) (-11.464)*** (-2.750)*** (-20.896)*** 
      
CF -0.2507 -0.2583 0.0356 -0.2322 -0.0500 
 (-6.439)*** (-18.887)*** (6.361)*** (-14.692)*** (-13.040)*** 
      
SQ_CF 0.5202 0.0026 -0.0460 -0.0437 0.0566 
 (6.845)*** (0.142) (-5.432)*** (-1.964)** (9.429)*** 
      
MB_RATIO 0.0060 -0.0321 -0.0115 -0.0428 0.0030 
 (2.235)** (-21.686)*** (-16.575)*** (-24.470)*** (9.508)*** 
      
LEVERAGE -0.1279 0.0522 0.0606 0.1120 -0.0003 
 (-4.669)*** (5.513)*** (15.919)*** (10.103)*** (-0.146) 
      
LOSS -0.0011 -0.0145 -0.0072 -0.0235 0.0026 
 (-0.160) (-4.847)*** (-5.863)*** (-6.787)*** (2.647)** 
      
FIRM_AGE -0.0064 0.0001 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (-26.575)*** (0.833) (5.467)*** (2.350)** (-2.613)*** 
      
S_GROWTH -0.0739 -0.0109 -0.0084 -0.0196 0.0081 
 (-4.848)*** (-3.063)*** (-5.789)*** (-4.761)*** (5.577)*** 
      
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0268 0.0805 0.0138 0.0947 0.0043 
 (1.423) (11.916)*** (4.711)*** (12.663)*** (1.947)* 
      
AZ_SCORE -0.0028 0.0016 0.0026 0.0038 -0.0002 
 (-0.471) (1.246) (4.920)*** (2.496)** (-0.889) 
      
CUM_RET -0.0121 0.0131 0.0013 0.0144 0.0006 
 (-4.790)*** (9.694)*** (2.358)** (9.304)*** (1.060) 
      
STD_RET 0.5090 0.0668 -0.0204 0.0460 0.0910 
 (7.401)*** (3.110)*** (-2.398)** (1.818)* (14.478)*** 
      
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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N 73,759   73,759   73,759  73,759   73,759   
adj. R-sq 0.589 0.139 0.166 0.161 0.167 
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Table 1.9 Change Regression Analysis 
This table reports the results of the pooled OLS change regressions between organization capital and earnings 
management. All dependent and independent variables are first differences. All dependent variables are measured 
one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), changes in real activities management proxies are dependent variables. 
In Column (4), a change in accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The independent 
variable of interest is ΔOC_TA_RATIO defined as a change in organization capital divided by total book value of 
assets. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from 
January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable ΔF1_AB_PROD ΔF1_MINUS_ AB_ADX ΔF1_RAM ΔF1_ABS_DA 
ΔOC_TA_RATIO -0.0487 -0.0251 -0.0741 0.0191 
 (-7.858)*** (-8.903)*** (-10.034)*** (5.094)*** 
     
ΔSIZE -0.0255 0.0004 -0.0234 -0.0054 
 (-7.240)*** (0.398) (-6.212)*** (-2.665)*** 
     
ΔCF 0.0309 -0.0030 0.0260 0.0883 
 (3.951)*** (-1.043) (3.096)*** (13.991)*** 
     
ΔSQ_CF -0.0472 0.0039 -0.0455 -0.0375 
 (-6.678)*** (1.317) (-5.674)*** (-7.572)*** 
     
ΔMB_RATIO -0.0051 -0.0062 -0.0104 0.0036 
 (-4.770)*** (-13.664)*** (-8.630)*** (5.463)*** 
     
ΔLEVERAGE -0.0517 0.0294 -0.0261       -0.0339 
 (-5.683)*** (8.689)*** (-2.543)**      (-5.382)*** 
     
ΔLOSS -0.0101 0.0031 -0.0076 0.0046 
 (-6.612)*** (6.122)*** (-4.730)*** (3.820)*** 
     
ΔFIRM_AGE 0.0023 -0.0007 0.0015 0.0005 
 (1.434) (-1.542) (0.889) (0.713) 
     
ΔS_GROWTH -0.0102 0.0007 -0.0096 -0.0024 
 (-3.961)*** (0.829) (-3.400)*** (-1.201) 
     
ΔSQ_S_GROWTH 0.0001 0.0009 0.0002 -0.0050 
 (0.020) (0.482) (0.036) (-1.386) 
     
ΔAZ_SCORE 0.0017 0.0031 0.0030 -0.0072 
 (1.108) (5.123)*** (1.663)* (-7.760)*** 
     
ΔCUM_RET -0.0001 0.0013 0.0012 -0.0009 
 (-0.112) (4.567)*** (1.332)       (-1.459) 
     
ΔSTD_RET -0.0143 0.0093 -0.0062 -0.0273 
 (-1.042) (2.041)** (-0.413) (-2.670)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 64,873    64,873   64,873   64,873   
adj. R-sq 0.019 0.055 0.025 0.025 
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Table 1.10 Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
This table presents results of the Difference-in-Difference (DID) tests on how exogenous change in organization 
capital due to the technology shock affect overproduction and accrual management. I first measure the change in 
organization capital from the pre-shock year (1990) to the post-shock year (1996). Based on the change in organization 
capital around this period, I sort firms with available data into three equal groups. The top group represents firms with 
greater improvement in organization capital whereas the bottom group represents firms with lower improvement in 
organization capital. Next, I create the treatment dummy (Treatment) which is equal to one if an observation belongs 
to the top group and zero otherwise. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. I require each 
observation to have sufficient data for the variables in the analysis. Panel A reports parameter estimates from the probit 
regressions for the pre-match and post-match groups. I calculate propensity scores by conducting a probit regression 
of Treatment on all control variables from the baseline regression model in equation (6). I match each firm in the top 
group (treatment firms) to a firm from other two groups (control firms) with the closest propensity score. If any control 
firm is matched with multiple treatment firms, I keep one pair with the closest propensity score. Panel B reports the 
univariate comparisons between the treatment and control firms’ characteristics. Panel C reports the DID test results. 
AB_PROD is abnormal production costs. ABS_DA is accrual management. In Panels A and B, the t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. In Panel C, standard errors reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Panel A: Pre-match and Post-Match Probit Regressions 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-Match Post-Match 
Dependent Variable Treatment Treatment 
   
SIZE 
0.0836 -0.0516 
(-3.63)*** (-1.56) 
   
CF 
1.2582 0.8085 
(2.04)* (1.33) 
   
SQ_CF 
-1.7407 -0.4762 
(-2.07)* (-0.44) 
   
MB_RATIO 
-0.0874 0.0100 
(-1.83) (0.20) 
   
LEVERAGE 
0.8430 -0.2930 
(4.29)*** (-1.02) 
   
LOSS 
-0.0413 -0.1213 
(-0.36) (-0.74) 
   
FIRM_AGE 
-0.0045 0.0007 
(-1.24) (0.14) 
   
S_GROWTH 
0.4723 0.2018 
(2.59)*** (0.92) 
   
SQ_S_GROWTH 
0.8939 0.1492 
(4.11)*** (0.57) 
   
AZ_SCORE 
-0.1818 -0.0631 
(-4.38)*** (-1.36) 
   
CUM_RET 
-0.0450 -0.1552 
(-0.48) (-1.28) 
   
STD_RET 
-4.1218 -0.0175 
(-5.13)*** (-0.01) 
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
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N 1,621   652 
Pseudo R-sq 0.096 0.014 
 
Panel B: Differences in Observables 
 
Panel C: Differences in Differences Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Mean Treatment 
Difference 
(After – Before) 
Mean Control 
Difference 
(After – Before) 
Mean DiD Estimator 
(Treatment – Control) 
T-statistics for  
DiD Estimator 
AB_PROD 
-0.009 0.024 -0.033 
-2.538 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) 
     
ABS_DA 
0.011 -0.004 0.015 
2.142 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) 
     
 
  
 Pre-Match  Post-Match 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Treatment Control Differences  Treatment Control Differences 
SIZE 5.430 4.732 0.698***  4.944 5.323 -0.379* 
CF 0.074 0.067 0.007  0.071 0.066 0.005 
SQ_CF 0.035 0.043 -0.008**  0.040 0.037 0.003 
MB_RATIO 1.165 1.323 -0.158***  1.306 1.259 0.047 
LEVERAGE 0.286 0.217 0.069***  0.251 0.272 -0.021 
LOSS 0.205 0.228 -0.023  0.207 0.222 -0.015 
FIRM_AGE 18.796 16.968 1.828**  18.040 19.109 -1.069 
S_GROWTH 0.132 0.071 0.061***  0.104 0.083 0.021 
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.191 0.150 0.041***  0.193 0.169 0.024 
AZ_SCORE 1.809 2.230 -0.421***  1.830 2.015 0.185 
CUM_RET -0.091 -0.041 -0.050*  -0.068 -0.051 -0.017 
STD_RET 0.110 0.124 -0.014***  0.117 0.113 0.004 
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Table 1.11 Using Investment Component of Main SG&A 
This table presents OLS regression results based on the same specification in Table 1.4, but replace the key 
independent variable (OC_TA_RATIO) with INV_OC. INV_OC is defined as the organization capital using the 
investment portion of Main SG&A expenditure from Enache and Srivastava (2017). All dependent variables are 
measured one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies are dependent variables. 
In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The definitions of other variables 
are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 
2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-
sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust 
to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
INV_OC -0.1593 -0.0121 -0.1719 0.0022 
 (-5.569)*** (-3.672)*** (-5.421)*** (2.353)** 
     
SIZE -0.0021 -0.0055 -0.0076 -0.0046 
 (-1.602) (-11.259)*** (-4.929)*** (-19.246)*** 
     
CF -0.2616 0.0343 -0.2326 -0.0521 
 (-17.665)*** (5.865)*** (-13.565)*** (-12.808)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0163 -0.0670 -0.0811 0.0629 
 (-0.906) (-8.017)*** (-3.624)*** (9.678)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0302 -0.0114 -0.0412 0.0031 
 (-20.344)*** (-16.102)*** (-22.945)*** (8.880)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0536 0.0657 0.1185            -0.0024 
 (5.034)*** (16.939)*** (9.272)***            (-1.094) 
     
LOSS -0.0109 -0.0075 -0.0195 0.0024 
 (-3.461)*** (-5.892)*** (-5.332)*** (2.335)** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0001 
 (2.135)** (6.739)*** (3.669)*** (-3.665)*** 
     
S_GROWTH 0.0185 -0.0012 0.0168 0.0066 
 (4.374)*** (-0.824) (3.462)*** (4.195)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0800 0.0154 0.0954 0.0060 
 (10.138)*** (4.911)*** (10.465)*** (2.474)** 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0048 0.0031 0.0077 -0.0003 
 (3.579)*** (5.544)*** (4.644)*** (-1.047) 
     
CUM_RET 0.0116 0.0015 0.0130 0.0009 
 (8.418)*** (2.803)*** (8.224)***              (1.486) 
     
STD_RET 0.0454 -0.0429 0.0023 0.0972 
 (1.741)* (-4.703)*** (0.075) (14.964)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 66,775    66,775   66,775   66,775   
adj. R-sq 0.229 0.150 0.228 0.166 
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Table 1.12 Industry Concentration 
This table presents the effect of industry concentration on the sensitivity of earnings management to organization 
capital. HI is Herfindahl Index based on sales for each three-digit SIC industry. The definitions of other variables are 
described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) 
level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO -0.1042 -0.0303 -0.1356 0.0052 
 (-19.403)*** (-12.251)*** (-21.308)*** (3.938)*** 
     
OC_TA_RATIO × HI 0.0156 0.0182 0.0334 -0.0023 
 (2.515)** (7.000)*** (4.442)*** (-1.441) 
     
HI 0.0502 0.0152 0.0648 0.0030 
 (5.158)*** (4.835)*** (5.875)*** (1.758)* 
     
SIZE 0.0018 -0.0048 -0.0031 -0.0048 
 (1.425) (-10.781)*** (-2.166)** (-20.912)*** 
     
CF -0.2544 0.0366 -0.2277 -0.0505 
 (-18.756)*** (6.653)*** (-14.583)*** (-13.275)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0064 -0.0500 -0.0556 0.0585 
 (-0.370) (-6.087)*** (-2.592)*** (9.840)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0320 -0.0115 -0.0427 0.0031 
 (-21.707)*** (-16.670)*** (-24.598)*** (9.542)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0517 0.0600 0.1106 -0.0008 
 (5.484)*** (16.109)*** (10.063)*** (-0.375) 
     
LOSS -0.0139 -0.0069 -0.0226 0.0025 
 (-4.660)*** (-5.622)*** (-6.574)*** (2.571)*** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0001 
 (0.623) (5.555)*** (2.150)** (-3.422)*** 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0086 -0.0072 -0.0163 0.0077 
 (-2.508)** (-5.322)*** (-4.180)*** (5.313)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0814 0.0143 0.0960 0.0041 
 (12.012)*** (4.931)*** (12.852)*** (1.880)* 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0018 0.0027 0.0041 -0.0003 
 (1.428) (5.306)*** (2.722)*** (-1.229) 
     
CUM_RET 0.0130 0.0012 0.0143 0.0006 
 (9.684)*** (2.301)** (9.303)*** (1.028) 
     
STD_RET 0.0620 -0.0220 0.0406 0.0926 
 (2.968)*** (-2.694)*** (1.661)* (15.038)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 73,759   73,759   73,759   73,759   
adj. R-sq 0.143 0.176 0.169 0.167 
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Table 1.13 Corporate Governance 
This table presents the OLS regression results after including GIM as an additional control variable. GIM is corporate 
governance index following Gompers et al. (2003). All dependent variables are measured one year forward. In 
Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies are dependent variables. In Column (4), accrual-based 
earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The independent variable of interest is OC_TA_RATIO defined 
as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. The definitions of other variables are described in 
Appendix A. After merging GIM data with my baseline data, I use observations with sufficient GIM data to run my 
revised regression model. As a result of the discrepancy between the data sets, the total remaining number of 
observations is 4,094. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 
are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ AB_ADX F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO -0.1616 -0.0510 -0.2093 0.0152 
 (-8.035)*** (-4.949)*** (-8.279)*** (2.069)** 
     
GIM 0.0014 0.0019 0.0033 -0.0001 
 (0.973) (2.894)*** (1.799)* (-0.395) 
     
SIZE 0.0135 -0.0024 0.0109 -0.0023 
 (3.325)*** (-1.652)* (2.324)** (-2.799)*** 
     
CF -0.2700 0.0285 -0.2378 -0.0999 
 (-4.828)*** (1.398) (-3.653)*** (-4.431)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0302 -0.1256 -0.1446 0.0703 
 (-0.377) (-4.092)*** (-1.596) (2.957)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0559 -0.0133 -0.0684 0.0038 
 (-12.521)*** (-8.413)*** (-13.910)*** (3.329)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0810 0.0427 0.1291 -0.0037 
 (3.059)*** (4.669)*** (4.269)*** (-0.494) 
     
LOSS -0.0199 -0.0066 -0.0260 -0.0011 
 (-2.042)** (-1.736)* (-2.277)** (-0.305) 
     
FIRM_AGE -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 
 (-0.708) (-0.166) (-0.647) (-0.051) 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0176 -0.0024 -0.0216 -0.0054 
 (-0.914) (-0.438) (-1.029) (-0.722) 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.1524 0.0078 0.1619 0.0218 
 (5.552)*** (0.890) (5.427)*** (1.903)* 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0136 -0.0007 0.0126 0.0010 
 (2.132)** (-0.368) (1.868)* (0.742) 
     
CUM_RET 0.0315 0.0020 0.0336 0.0037 
 (4.370)*** (0.775) (4.122)*** (1.447) 
     
STD_RET 0.0519 -0.1245 -0.0806 0.1001 
 (0.641) (-4.370)*** (-0.913) (2.950)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,094   4,094 4,094  4,094 
adj. R-sq 0.251 0.232 0.279 0.148 
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Table 1.14 Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table illustrates the results by replacing cash flow volatility (SQ_CF) with idiosyncratic risk (IVOL). All 
dependent variables are measured one year forward. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies 
are dependent variables. In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. The 
independent variable of interest is OC_TA_RATIO defined as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. 
The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January 
of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ 
AB_ADX 
F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
OC_TA_RATIO -0.0971 -0.0225 -0.1209 0.0052 
 (-21.814)*** (-11.604)*** (-22.855)*** (4.946)*** 
     
SIZE 0.0018 -0.0052 -0.0035 -0.0045 
 (1.398) (-11.342)*** (-2.346)** (-19.060)*** 
     
CF -0.2565 0.0366 -0.2298 -0.0506 
 (-18.932)*** (6.597)*** (-14.733)*** (-13.088)*** 
     
IVOL 0.0986 -0.0332 0.0657 0.0647 
 (3.563)*** (-2.979)*** (2.058)** (6.354)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0322 -0.0118 -0.0432 0.0034 
 (-21.646)*** (-17.094)*** (-24.583)*** (10.445)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0542 0.0625 0.1154 -0.0020 
 (5.729)*** (16.637)*** (10.443)*** (-0.916) 
     
LOSS -0.0143 -0.0073 -0.0233 0.0027 
 (-4.775)*** (-5.896)*** (-6.755)*** (2.728)*** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 
 (1.311) (5.970)*** (2.842)*** (-2.355)** 
     
S_GROWTH -0.0099 -0.0078 -0.0181 0.0077 
 (-2.850)*** (-5.731)*** (-4.609)*** (5.336)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0795 0.0110 0.0908 0.0074 
 (11.885)*** (3.767)*** (12.202)*** (3.371)*** 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0022 0.0033 0.0050 -0.0009 
 (1.771)* (6.547)*** (3.432)*** (-3.326)*** 
     
CUM_RET 0.0135 0.0013 0.0148 0.0006 
 (9.961)*** (2.459)** (9.557)*** (1.110) 
     
STD_RET -0.0143 -0.0120 -0.0257 0.0601 
 (-0.704) (-1.491) (-1.097) (6.627)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 73,759 73,759  73,759 73,759 
adj. R-sq 0.140 0.165 0.162 0.164 
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Table 1.15 Managerial Ability 
This table exhibits the robustness test results by employing the managerial ability score. The independent variable of 
interest is MA_SCORE defined as the managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012). In Columns (1) (2) and (3), 
real activities management proxies are dependent variables. In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy 
is a dependent variable. All dependent variables are measured one year forward. The definitions of other variables are 
described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) 
level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ 
AB_ADX 
F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
MA_SCORE -0.4782 -0.1215 -0.5994 0.0247 
 (-26.454)*** (-16.998)*** (-27.003)*** (8.127)*** 
     
SIZE 0.0080 -0.0038 0.0042 -0.0052 
 (6.209)*** (-7.879)*** (2.758)*** (-22.255)*** 
     
CF -0.1825 0.0472 -0.1430 -0.0541 
 (-13.411)*** (8.656)*** (-9.129)*** (-13.416)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0630 -0.0617 -0.1249 0.0616 
 (-3.840)*** (-7.987)*** (-6.327)*** (10.148)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0282 -0.0102 -0.0377 0.0028 
 (-19.193)*** (-15.030)*** (-21.813)*** (8.012)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0406 0.0586 0.0980 0.0007 
 (4.544)*** (15.767)*** (9.138)*** (0.317) 
     
LOSS -0.0114 -0.0082 -0.0209 0.0028 
 (-3.922)*** (-6.744)*** (-6.229)*** (2.725)*** 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0007 0.0004 0.0011 -0.0001 
 (4.066)*** (7.715)*** (5.828)*** (-4.137)*** 
     
S_GROWTH 0.0299 -0.0003 0.0298 0.0060 
 (8.280)*** (-0.188) (7.245)*** (3.914)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0880 0.0140 0.1022 0.0048 
 (12.954)*** (4.660)*** (13.539)*** (2.070)** 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0070 0.0037 0.0104 -0.0004 
 (5.638)*** (7.263)*** (7.026)*** (-1.416) 
     
CUM_RET 0.0110 0.0007 0.0117 0.0009 
 (8.220)*** (1.413) (7.732)*** (1.647)* 
     
STD_RET 0.0187 -0.0364 -0.0168 0.0946 
 (0.891) (-4.258)*** (-0.682) (14.998)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 70,306 70,306  70,306 70,306   
adj. R-sq 0.164 0.176 0.194 0.164 
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Table 1.16 Employee Satisfaction 
This table shows the robustness test results by using employee satisfaction proxy. The independent variable of interest 
is BEST_FOR_WORK which is equal to one if a firm is included in the Fortune magazine’s “100 Best Companies to 
Work for in America” list, 0 otherwise. In Columns (1) (2) and (3), real activities management proxies are dependent 
variables. In Column (4), accrual-based earnings management proxy is a dependent variable. All dependent variables 
are measured one year forward. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year 
observations are from January of 2002 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, 
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at 
both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable F1_AB_PROD F1_MINUS_ 
AB_ADX 
F1_RAM F1_ABS_DA 
BEST_FOR_WORK -0.0696 -0.0116 -0.0810 -0.0004 
 (-4.507)*** (-1.696)* (-4.103)*** (-0.136) 
     
SIZE 0.0020 -0.0035 -0.0016 -0.0054 
 (1.317) (-6.157)*** (-0.883) (-17.490)*** 
     
CF -0.2282 0.0481 -0.1888 -0.0473 
 (-11.371)*** (6.055)*** (-8.094)*** (-9.259)*** 
     
SQ_CF -0.0815 -0.0460 -0.1295 0.0449 
 (-3.573)*** (-4.390)*** (-4.584)*** (6.321)*** 
     
MB_RATIO -0.0374 -0.0140 -0.0505 0.0029 
 (-14.846)*** (-13.213)*** (-17.172)*** (6.398)*** 
     
LEVERAGE 0.0562 0.0571 0.1133 0.0010 
 (4.108)*** (10.410)*** (7.177)*** (0.343) 
     
LOSS -0.0185 -0.0077 -0.0281 -0.0009 
 (-4.195)*** (-4.408)*** (-5.433)*** (-0.669) 
     
FIRM_AGE 0.0006 0.0005 0.0011 -0.0001 
 (3.502)*** (7.181)*** (5.272)*** (-1.211) 
     
S_GROWTH 0.0054 -0.0076 -0.0027 0.0067 
 (1.028) (-3.592)*** (-0.445) (3.254)*** 
     
SQ_S_GROWTH 0.0925 0.0150 0.1080 0.0016 
 (9.097)*** (3.328)*** (9.517)*** (0.494) 
     
AZ_SCORE 0.0057 0.0038 0.0093 -0.0012 
 (3.806)*** (6.012)*** (5.009)*** (-3.768)*** 
     
CUM_RET 0.0129 0.0022 0.0149 -0.0005 
 (6.502)*** (2.909)*** (6.585)*** (-0.641) 
     
STD_RET 0.0072 -0.0432 -0.0305 0.0746 
 (0.263) (-3.674)*** (-0.936) (8.988)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 35,488 35,488 35,488 35,488 
adj. R-sq 0.111 0.180 0.133 0.160 
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Figure 1.1 Time Line: Managers with Greater Organization Capital 
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Figure 1.2 Technological Collaboration Network 
 
 
 
Notes:  
Figure 1.2 illustrates how the technology shock changes the structure of the technology alliances networks during 
years between 1990 and 2005. Source: Schilling (2016). 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
F1_AB_PROD Abnormal production costs, defined as the difference between actual 
production costs and normal production costs from Zang (2012) in year 
t+1. 
F1_ MINUS_AB_ADX Multiplication of negative one and abnormal adjusted discretionary 
expenses. Abnormal adjusted discretionary expenses are calculated as 
the difference between actual adjusted discretionary expenses and 
normal adjusted discretionary expenses in year t+1. The definition of 
adjusted discretionary expenses is the sum of advertising and R&D 
expenditures, which is calculated by subtracting the SG&A expenditure 
from discretionary expenses. 
F1_RAM Real activities manipulation index, calculated by abnormal production 
costs minus abnormal adjusted discretionary expenses from Zang (2012) 
in year t+1 
F1_ABS_DA Absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated following the 
modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) in year t+1. 
OC_TA_RATIO Organization capital divided by total book value of assets proposed by 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) in year t. 
SIZE Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total sales in year t. 
CF Cash flows, proxied as (incomes before extraordinary items + 
depreciation) / total book value of assets in year t.  
SQ_CF Cash flow volatility, using the standard deviation of cash flows in year 
t. 
MB_RATIO Market-to-book ratio, calculated by (closing stock price × number of 
shares outstanding + long-term debt + current debt) / total book value of 
assets in year t.  
LEVERAGE (Long-term debt + debt in current liabilities) / total book value of assets 
in year t. 
LOSS Equal to 0 if income before extraordinary items are greater or equal to 
zero, 1 otherwise in year t. 
FIRM_AGE Firm age, proxied by the number of years listed on Compustat in year t. 
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S_GROWTH Sales growth, defined as the ratio of sales in year t to sales in year t-1.   
SQ_S_GROWTH Standard deviation of sales growth. 
AZ_SCORE Altman (1968)’s Z-score, defined as (3.3  × operation income after 
depreciation + sales + 1.4  × retained earnings +1.2  × (current assets 
minus current liability)) / total book value of assets in year t. 
CUM_RET Cumulative stock returns over year t. 
STD_RET Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous two years 
in year t. 
OC_DECILE Annual decile rank based on the level of OC_TA_RATIO. 
IND_ADJ_OC Industry-median adjusted organization capital, measured as 
OC_TA_RATIO minus industry-median OC_TA_RATIO under the 
Fama-French 10 industry classification scheme. 
INV_OC Organization capital using the investment portion of Main SG&A from 
Enache and Srivastava (2017). 
HI Herfindahl Index, which is the sum of squared market shares in each 
three-digit SIC industry. 
GIM Governance Index from Gompers et al. (2003). 
IVOL Idiosyncratic risk, measured by the standard deviation of residuals from 
a regression of a firm’s monthly stock returns on the monthly returns of 
market index over the previous 36 months (McLean 2010). 
MA_SCORE Managerial ability score of Demerjian et al. (2012) 
BEST_FOR_WORK Equal to 1 if a firm is included in the Fortune magazine’s “100 Best 
Companies to Work for in America” list, 0 otherwise. 
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ESSAY 2: ORGANIZATION CAPITAL AND CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
 In my previous essay, I discuss how managerial mindsets are associated with 
organization capital. Internally, organization capital encourages long-term management 
approaches in real operations. Externally, however, organization capital can intensify short-term 
pressure on managers by firm outsiders. Taken together, these internal and external mechanisms 
can affect cash holdings in firms. To extend this view, this essay aims to create a better 
understanding of how organization capital and corporate cash holdings are related. To that effect, 
I address three questions: (i) Do firms with high organization capital build more cash holdings? 
(ii) If yes, is this because organization capital increases growth opportunities as well as financial 
constraints of firms? (iii) Does the threat of hostile takeover play a disciplining role for firms 
with high organization capital? 
 Interestingly, there has been a surge in the U.S. average cash ratio. Specifically, the 
average cash ratio for U.S. corporations was 10.5% in 1980 and increased to 23.6% by 2006 
(Bates et al. 2009). Although various firm-level motives are associated with an increase in 
corporate cash holdings, a precautionary motive has emerged as a significant force in the recent 
surge in corporate cash holdings. Prior literature on the precautionary motive has shown that (i) 
when firms have better growth opportunities, they are likely to hoard more cash (Opler et al. 
1999; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Chen & Chuang 2009; Pinkowitz et al. 2013), and (ii) when firms 
are more financially constrained, they tend to build more cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999; Bates 
et al. 2009; Denis & Sibilkov 2010; Harford et al. 2014).  
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 Regarding the growth opportunities, I examine organization capital because in today’s 
knowledge economy, intangible assets such as information systems, and human capital play a 
crucial role in companies’ growth (Zingales 2000). For instance, organization capital has a 
positive influence on operational and innovative efficiencies (Li et al. 2017), economic values 
(Martín-Oliver & Salas-Fumás 2012), and corporate performance (McKinsey Global Institute 
2002). As expected, I find that organization capital is positively associated with growth 
opportunities. Considering that firms with better growth opportunities tend to have more cash 
reserves, I argue that firms with higher organization capital should build more cash reserves. 
 To better understand the positive relation between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings, my study provides a framework for the impact of organization capital on financial 
constraints. Prior studies on information asymmetry offer a possible explanation for the positive 
impact organization capital has on financial constraints. Due to the information asymmetry 
between managers and firm outsiders, firm outsiders may respond less favorably to investments 
in intangible capital (Stein 1989; Edmans 2011). For example, firms with high asymmetric 
information have more difficulties in debt financing (Carpenter & Petersen 2002) as well as 
equity financing (Hughes et al. 2007). Unlike physical capital, organization capital is an invisible 
asset that can exacerbate the information asymmetry between managers and firm outsiders. As a 
result, information asymmetry may lead high organization capital firms to have more financial 
constraints when obtaining external financing, which implies that increasing organization capital 
results in firms relying more on internal financing. 
 This paper also examines the disciplining role of corporate governance affecting the 
organization capital-cash holdings relationship. Prior literature on the agency theory (e.g., Jensen 
(1986) and Myers and Rajan (1998)) argues that corporate cash holdings can be easily converted 
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for the private purposes of managers and thus could induce moral hazard problems. Given that 
firms with high organization capital tend to have a high volume of cash reserves, it follows that 
they are more likely to experience moral hazard problems. In this study, I propose corporate 
governance to solve the agency problems potentially associated with high organization capital 
firms. Under stronger corporate governance, managers are more disciplined and hold less cash 
reserves (Dittmar et al. 2003; Ivalina & Lins 2007; Harford et al. 2008; Yun 2009).  With the aid 
of recent scholarly exploration of corporate governance, I suggest that stronger corporate 
governance would discipline managers and reduce the positive relationship between organization 
capital and cash reserves.  
 I empirically check the positive relation between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings from 1987 through 2016. Consistent with my hypothesis, I find that firms with high 
organization capital build more cash holdings. The positive effect of organization capital on 
subsequent cash holdings is persistent over three years. These findings provide statistically 
significant evidence that organization capital can lead firms to build more cash reserves.  
 Regarding the growth opportunities channel, I find that organization capital is positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q. I next examine whether organization capital increases financial 
constraints of firms. As firms face a higher degree of financial constraint, they tend to have 
higher sensitivity of cash holdings to internal cash flow (Almeida et al. 2004; Chen & Wang 
2012; Erel et al. 2015). Following the prior literature, my empirical analyses show that firms 
with high organization capital do indeed have higher sensitivity of cash holdings to internal cash 
flow. That is, organization capital could encourage firms to save more cash holdings from 
internal cash flows. This confirms my hypothesis that firms tend to become more dependent on 
78 
internal financing since an increase in organization capital generates difficulties for firms to 
obtain external sources of finance. 
 Furthermore, I test the corporate governance channel by using the hostile takeover index 
provided by Cain et al. (2017). Under the threat of hostile takeover, managers are exposed to the 
risk of being replaced. For this reason, the threat of hostile takeover is one of the strongest 
corporate governance mechanism to discipline managers (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Bertrand & 
Mullainathan 2003; Atanassov 2013). Consistent with the disciplining role of corporate 
governance, I find that a stronger threat of hostile takeover significantly weakens the positive 
association between organization capital and cash reserves.     
 My empirical results are robust to conducting a two-stage least squares (2SLS) test, 
change regressions, and the difference-in-difference (DID) test for the concern of omitted 
variables and endogeneity. By using alternative measures of organization capital such as annual 
decile rank of organization capital or industry-median adjusted organization capital, I provide 
additional support to the positive relationship between organization capital and cash reserves. 
When I measure organization capital by following Enache and Srivastava’s (2017) investment 
portion of Main SG&A, the positive association between organization capital and financial 
constraints of firms, which is my main finding, is significant only when firms have positive 
internal cash flows. 
 My research contributes to several strands of the literature on the corporate cash holdings. 
A growing amount of literature analyzes the various determinants for corporate cash holdings. 
For example, Mulligan (1997) explains that firm size is negatively related to corporate cash 
ratios. Past literature also shows that investor protection (Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Dittmar & 
Mahrt-Smith 2007) and tax avoidance (Fritz Foley et al. 2007; Harford et al. 2017) significantly 
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affect the corporate cash reserves. Some authors suggest that the precautionary motive is a 
critical determinant for corporate cash holdings. Opler et al. (1999), Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), 
Chen and Chuang (2009), and Pinkowitz et al. (2013) show that firms with more growth 
opportunities have more cash holdings. Additionally, financial constraints are positively related 
to corporate cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009; Denis & Sibilkov 2010; Harford 
et al. 2014). My contribution to this body of literature is to identify (i) more growth 
opportunities and (ii) more financial constraints for corporations with high organization capital. 
In particular, my findings complement the cash holdings literature by emphasizing the 
precautionary motive for corporate cash holdings by understanding the positive association 
between organization capital and corporate cash holdings. 
 My paper also provides contributions to the literature on corporate governance and 
hostile takeover. The academic literature has already demonstrated that strong corporate 
governance can reduce corporate cash holdings (e.g., Dittmar et al. (2003), Ivalina and Lins 
(2007), Harford et al. (2008), and Yun (2009)). My research goes beyond the previous finding to 
find that corporate governance, by disciplining managers through the threat of hostile takeover, 
can significantly weaken the association between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings. 
 The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes prior literature and 
hypothesis development. Then, the data and variable measurements are illustrated in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents empirical models and results. Section 5 provides robustness tests. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development 
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2.1  Organization Capital and Corporate Cash Holdings 
 Interestingly, since the 1980s, there has been a surge in the average U.S. cash ratio. 
Specifically, the average cash ratio for firms in the U.S. was 10.5% in 1980 and rose to 23.6% by 
2006 (Bates et al. 2009). Figure 2.1 shows the average cash ratio from my sample period, 1987 
to 2016. The average cash ratio grew higher especially in the later years of my sample. 
 
 [Figure 2.1 About Here] 
 
 My paper aims to examine the impact of organization capital on corporate cash holdings. 
I do this by investigating three possible channels through which organization capital can affect 
cash holdings decisions: (i) the growth opportunities channel; (ii) the financial constraints 
channel; and (iii) the corporate governance channel. I hypothesize that organization capital has a 
positive impact on growth opportunities, an idea investigated further in Section 2.2. The growth 
opportunities channel suggests that firms may keep more cash in reserve to take advantage of 
better growth opportunities (Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Chen & Chuang 2009; 
Pinkowitz et al. 2013). Considering that high organization capital firms can have better growth 
opportunities, I argue that these firms should hold more cash. In Section 2.3, the positive relation 
between organization capital and financial constraints is explained. The financial constraints 
channel argues that financial constraints can lead firms to rely heavily on internal financing, and 
thus build greater cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009; Denis & Sibilkov 2010; 
Harford et al. 2014). I therefore construct the following hypothesis describing the positive 
influence of organization capital on corporate cash holdings. 
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 Hypothesis 1: There is a positive association between organization capital and corporate 
cash holdings. 
 
 The corporate governance channel insists that stronger corporate governance mechanisms 
discipline managers and thus firms are less motivated to hold cash balances (Dittmar et al. 2003; 
Ivalina & Lins 2007; Harford et al. 2008; Yun 2009). Accordingly, the positive association 
between organization capital and corporate cash holdings might be weaker under strong 
corporate governance. The disciplinary role of corporate governance for firms high in 
organization capital is described in Section 2.4. 
 
2.2  Growth Opportunities Channel 
 Prior literature on corporate cash holdings suggests that firms might try to maintain 
higher levels of cash holdings to take advantage of growth opportunities (Opler et al. 1999; 
Ozkan & Ozkan 2004; Chen & Chuang 2009; Pinkowitz et al. 2013). In this section, I examine 
the impact of organization capital, which is an intangible asset that can positively contribute to 
the development of a corporation, on growth opportunities.15 Organization capital is defined as 
the organizational knowledge for the utilization of employees (Prescott & Visscher 1980). Prior 
literature suggests that organization capital can generate fundamental impacts on the 
development of a corporation.16 Typical examples of organization capital are organizational 
                                                 
15 In today’s knowledge economy, intangible assets, such as organization capital, have a crucial role for companies’ 
growth (Zingales 2000).  
16 Organization capital can cultivate the abilities of key talents (Black & Lynch 2005). Li et al. (2017) report that firms 
with greater organization capital tend to have higher employee satisfaction and better managerial quality. Organization 
capital can result in better performance so that key employees can then expect higher future compensation (Atkeson 
& Kehoe 2005; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou 2013). In my essay 1, I find that organization capital can reduce opportunistic 
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know-how about each employee’s aptitude for a project, employee training programs, and 
allocations of human resources.  
 By better utilizing organization capital, a firm can achieve greater efficiency in its overall 
operations. For instance, Li et al. (2017) show that organization capital is positively associated 
with operational and innovative efficiency measures. Martín-Oliver and Salas-Fumás (2012) find 
the positive impact of organization capital on the economic value of Spanish banks. Corporations 
investing more in organization capital during market recessions had better firm performance on 
average between 1982 and 1999, as reported by McKinsey Global Institute (2002). These 
findings support my argument that high organization capital firms should have better growth 
opportunities. To summarize: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: There is a positive association between organization capital and growth 
opportunities of firms. 
 
2.3  Financial Constraints Channel 
 Prior studies on corporate cash holdings find that the precautionary motive for cash 
holdings plays a crucial role in determining the demand for cash (e.g., Opler et al. (1999), Bates 
et al. (2009), Pinkowitz et al. (2013)).17 With its incoming cash flows, a firm has options with 
                                                 
management such as overproduction, reduction in marketing expenditure, and cuts in research and development 
expenditure. These findings suggest that organization capital might improve corporate performance overall. 
17 In addition to the precautionary motive, there are other motives for firms to hold cash. The transaction motive (e.g., 
Mulligan (1997)) means that firms hold cash to avoid the transaction costs for converting a non-cash asset into cash. 
The tax motive means that the cash ratios of multinational firms kept high to avoid tax associated with repatriation of 
foreign earnings (Fritz Foley et al. 2007). The agency motive (e.g. Jensen (1986)) views the cash holdings as a result 
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respect to payments to capital providers. The precautionary motive suggests that firms should 
hold a portion of their cash flows as cash or cash equivalent in order to finance their future 
investment opportunities against future shocks.18 Accordingly, corporate cash holdings are 
positively associated with financial constraints (Opler et al. 1999; Bates et al. 2009).  
 To better understand the relation between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings, I attempt to confirm the positive influence of organization capital on financial 
constraints. Due to information asymmetry between managers and firm outsiders, firm outsiders 
may respond less favorably to intangible investments (Stein 1989; Edmans 2011). Specifically, 
firms with high asymmetric information (e.g., small high-tech firms) are less likely to have 
access to debt financing (Carpenter & Petersen 2002). Greater information asymmetry also 
yields the higher risk premiums required by investors in equity markets (Hughes et al. 2007). 
Therefore, information asymmetry can lead to firms to having greater difficulties obtaining 
external financing, and instead relying on internal financing. Considering that organization 
capital is an intangible asset that can exacerbate information asymmetry, I suggest that 
organization capital can generate difficulties for firms to obtain external sources of finance.19 
Hence, my third hypothesis is: 
 
 Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relation between organization capital and financial 
constraints. 
                                                 
of the agency problem. In line with this logic, Dittmar et al. (2003) and Harford et al. (2008) find that firms with a 
greater agency problem tend to hold greater cash balances.   
18 Firms prefer internal financial slack rather than issuing debts or stocks when they finance new projects (Myers & 
Majluf 1984). 
19 In Essay 1, I show that firms with high organization capital are more likely to engage in accrual management to 
cope with the firm outsider’s short-term earnings pressure. 
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2.4  Corporate Governance Channel 
 In Section 2.1, I hypothesize the positive relation between organization capital and 
corporate cash reserves. Consistent with my hypothesis, high organization capital firms tend to 
have high levels of cash holdings. This phenomenon might spur concerns about moral hazard 
problems. According to the agency theory of Jensen (1986), high corporate cash holdings can 
induce the moral hazard problems of free cash flow. Compared to other assets, cash reserves can 
easily be used for managers’ private interests at the expense of shareholders (Myers & Rajan 
1998). Considering the findings of all of these studies, I pose the following question: What might 
mitigate agency problems potentially embedded in firms with high organization capital? 
 With this in mind, in this section, I examine the corporate governance channel. Prior 
literature suggests that corporate governance can affect agency problems. In particular, under a 
weak corporate governance mechanism (e.g., managers who are not effectively monitored by 
shareholders), managers tend to reserve more cash holdings (Dittmar et al. 2003; Ivalina & Lins 
2007; Harford et al. 2008; Yun 2009). Conversely, stronger corporate governance encourages 
firms to hold less cash holdings. This disciplinary role of corporate governance provides a 
framework for analyzing the relation between organization capital and corporate cash holdings. I 
suggest that stronger corporate governance can discipline managers and thus the positive 
association between organization capital and corporate cash holdings can be weaker.  To 
summarize: 
 
 Hypothesis 4: The positive relation between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings is weaker for firms with stronger corporate governance. 
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3  Data and Variable Measurement 
3.1  Data 
 To analyze the relation between organization capital and corporate cash holdings, I obtain 
corporate financial statement information using the Compustat annual database. The definitions 
of cash holdings, organization capital, and control variables are presented in Appendix A. To 
mitigate impacts of outliers, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. After 
eliminating firm-year observations with insufficient data in the database to calculate variables in 
my empirical investigations, my final baseline sample consists of 70,317 firm-year observations 
from January 1987 through December 2016. 
 
3.2  Measure of Cash Holdings and Organization Capital 
 Following Almeida et al. (2004), and Brown and Petersen (2011), the cash ratio (CASH) 
of each firm is measured as the cash and marketable securities divided by total book value of 
assets. To measure organization capital (OC), I use the model by Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 
(2013). By taking the sum of the deflated flows from sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenditure, this model can measure the organization capital. The underlying reason for this is 
that, at market equilibrium, the sum of the present value of all expenditures for an asset should be 
equal to the present value of the asset. Considering that SG&A expenditure contains information 
expenditures and labor costs such as employee wages, training cost, and consulting fees (Lev & 
Radhakrishnan 2005), the deflated flows from SG&A expenditure can be used for measuring the 
value of organization capital. 
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 Based on the model of Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), the value of organization 
capital at a specific year can be determined using the following equation: 
 
 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿)𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 +  
𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝑐𝑝𝑖𝑡
                                                   (1) 
  
 In this equation, for each firm i and year t, V stands for the value of organization capital. 
δ is a constant depreciation rate of organization capital. SGAt represents SG&A expenditure at 
time t.  To calculate the deflated value of SG&A expenditure, I utilize the consumer price index 
at time t (cpit). Following the prior literature, I choose to use the value of 15% for δ. Any 
missing data in SG&A expenditure is converted to the value of zero.  
 To complete Equation (1), a firm i’s initial value of organization capital must be 
determined. Based on the perpetual inventory model of Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), I 
estimate each firm i’s initial value of organization capital by using the equation below:  
 
 𝑉𝑖,0 = 
𝑆𝐺𝐴1
𝑔 + 𝛿
                                                                   (2) 
 
 g indicates the mean real growth rate of firm-level SG&A expenditure. Consistent with 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013), I choose g as 10%. I divide the organization capital by its 
book value of total assets (OC) and use OC in my baseline regressions. 
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3.3  Control Variables 
 Following Almeida et al. (2004), and Brown and Petersen Consistent with Frésard and 
Salva (2010), I also control for firm size (SIZE), and dividends (DIV). Firm size might be 
negatively associated with the cash ratio. Thanks to the economies of scale, larger firms have 
lower transaction costs for converting a non-cash asset into cash, which can reduce the motive 
for cash holdings (Mulligan 1997; Bates et al. 2009). DIV is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 
if a firm paid dividends in each year, and 0 otherwise. Paying dividends can reduce cash reserves 
of a firm. Next, I follow Opler et al. (1999), Almeida et al. (2004), and Brown and Petersen 
(2011) and include cash flows (CF), net working capital (NWC), Tobin’s Q (Q) and capital 
expenditure (CAPEX). Considering that a certain portion of cash flows is retained as cash 
holdings, cash flows are associated with cash holdings. Net working capital substitutes cash 
holdings, implying a negative relation between net working capital and cash holdings. As firms 
have more investment opportunities proxied by Tobin’s Q, they tend to hold more cash. Capital 
expenditure, as a payment for acquisitions, can reduce cash holdings. Additional control 
variables are net new long-term debt (N_DEBT), and acquisition (ACQ), which could be 
determinants of corporate cash holdings (Harford et al. 2008; Harford et al. 2014). The 
measurements of variables are described in Appendix A. 
 
4  Empirical Results 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1 reports the 25th percentile, mean, median, 75th percentile, and standard 
deviation for cash holdings, organization capital, and other control variables used in my 
analyses. Median organization capital (OC) is 0.184. Mean sample firm has 0.198 in cash 
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holdings (CASH), which corresponds to $402.72 million given the mean value of the total asset 
is $2,033.942 million.  
 [Table 2.1 About Here] 
 
 Table 2.2 shows the correlation between the sample variables. I observe that the 
correlation coefficient between OC and Tobin’s Q (Q) is significantly positive (0.2545). This 
result provides an indication that firms with high organization capital may have more investment 
opportunities. To capture the increased investment opportunities, these firms tend to hold more 
cash. Consistent with my Hypothesis 1, organization capital (OC) and cash holdings (F1_CASH) 
are positively correlated (0.2014) and significant.  
 [Table 2.2 About Here] 
 
4.2  Impact of Organization Capital on Corporate Cash Holdings 
 In Table 2.3, I rank all observations into 10 groups based on the magnitude of organization 
capital in each year between 1987 and 2016. The results in Table 2.3 present that the level of 
median cash holdings is greater as organization capital increases. The median cash ratio of the 
group with the lowest organization capital is 0.0663 as opposed to 0.2899 for the group with the 
highest organization capital. Consistent with my Hypothesis 1, firms with high organization 
capital are more likely to build cash holdings.  
[Table 2.3 About Here] 
 
 To check Hypothesis 1 empirically, I conduct the following regression: 
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 𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ɛi,t                       (3) 
  
 where, for firm i and year t, CASH is corporate cash holdings; OC denotes organization 
capital scaled by total book value of assets; Controls include cash flows (CF), net working 
capital (NWC), Tobin’s Q (Q), capital expenditure (CAPEX), firm size (SIZE), dividends (DIV), 
net new long-term debt (N_DEBT), and acquisition (ACQ). The definitions of variables are 
given in Appendix A. I also include year fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects 
(Industry) to account for time and industry trends. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust 
in all the specifications and are clustered at the firm level. 
 Table 2.4 shows the empirical results of estimating Equation (3). Column 1 of Table 2.4 
presents a significant and positive relationship between organization capital and one-year 
forward cash holdings, indicating that firms with greater organization capital tend to accumulate 
more cash holdings. In Columns (2) and (3), I replace one-year forward (t+1) cash holdings by 
two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The coefficient of organization capital 
remains positively significant in Columns (2) and (3), implying that the positive effect of 
organization capital on subsequent cash holdings is persistent over three years. Based on my 
empirical results together, I find that organization capital is associated with more corporate cash 
holdings in the following years, which advocates my Hypothesis 1. 
[Table 2.4 About Here] 
 
4.3  Organization Capital and Growth Opportunities 
 To test whether organization capital varies with growth opportunities, I estimate the 
following equation: 
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 𝑄𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ɛi,t                       (4) 
  
 where, for firm i and year t, Q is Tobin’s Q measured as the market value of equity minus 
the book value of equity plus the book value of total assets; OC denotes organization capital 
scaled by total book value of assets; Controls include book value of total assets (ASSETS), firm 
age (AGE), profitability (PROF), tangibility (TANG), and cash flows (CF). The variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Year (Year) and industry (Industry) dummies are also included to 
capture yearly and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are estimated with clustered errors at 
the firm level and are robust to heteroscedasticity. 
 Table 2.5 reports the empirical relationship between organization capital and growth 
opportunities. The coefficients of organization capital on subsequent growth opportunities are 
significantly positive. This evidence lends support to Hypothesis 2, that organization capital is 
positively associated with growth opportunities. 
[Table 2.5 About Here] 
 
4.4  Organization Capital and Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
 If firms face a higher degree of financial constraints, they tend to have a higher sensitivity 
of cash holdings to internal cash flow (Almeida et al. 2004; Chen & Wang 2012; Erel et al. 
2015). That is, firms may hold a larger portion of their internal cash flows as cash or cash 
equivalent to finance their future investment opportunities because of the difficulty in accessing 
external finance.  
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 In line with this logic, firms tend to become more dependent on internal financing as an 
increase in organization capital generates difficulties for firms to obtain external sources of 
finance. To test this prediction, I follow Almeida et al. (2004)’s regression model: 
 
 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹 × 𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  ɛi,t                           (5) 
  
 where, for firm i and year t, ΔCASH is the change in the ratio of holdings of cash and 
marketable securities to total book value of assets; CF denotes cash flows scaled by total book 
value of assets; CF × OC is the interaction term between CF and OC; Q stands for Tobin’s Q; 
SIZE represents firm size. The definitions of variables are described in Appendix A. All 
variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. In my regression, year fixed effects 
and industry fixed effects are included. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm 
level and heteroscedasticity. 
 The impact of organization capital on the sensitivity of cash reserves to cash flows is 
highlighted in the interaction term, CF × OC, which is my variable of interest. If my prediction 
is true, the interaction term will have a significantly positive coefficient. The empirical result of 
estimating Equation (5) is displayed in Table 2.6. The coefficient of CF × OC on ΔCASH is 
positively significant, supporting that firms save more cash holdings from internal cash flows as 
organization capital increases. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3, that an increase in 
organization capital can lead firms to rely more on internal financing. 
[Table 2.6 About Here] 
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4.5  Organization Capital and the Threat of a Hostile Takeover 
 Under the threat of a hostile takeover, managers of the target firm could be replaced if 
shareholders accept a tender offer from a bidder, which would result in acquiring control of the 
target firm. The threat of being replaced can motivate managers to maximize shareholders’ 
benefits. In this sense, the threat of a hostile takeover is considered one of the strongest corporate 
governance mechanisms (Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Bertrand & Mullainathan 2003; Atanassov 
2013).   
 Hypothesis 4 suggests that stronger corporate governance disciplines managers and thus, 
it can weaken the positive relation between organization capital and corporate cash holdings. To 
empirically test my hypothesis, I run the following regression model: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡+𝑛 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐻𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + ɛi,t    (6) 
  
 where, for firm i and year t, CASH represents corporate cash holdings; OC is organization 
capital scaled by total book value of assets; HT denotes hostile takeover index from Cain et al. 
(2017); Controls include control variables that are described in Equation (3).20 For Year, 
Industry, and standard errors, refer to Equation (3) in Section 4.2. 
 In Equation (6), the variable of interest is the intersection between organization capital 
and hostile takeover index (OC × HT), which captures the influence of a hostile takeover threat 
on the sensitivity of cash holdings to organization capital. Table 2.7 shows that the coefficients 
of OC × HT on subsequent cash holdings are significantly negative, implying that the positive 
relation between organization capital and cash holdings is weaker for firms with a stronger threat 
                                                 
20 Hostile takeover index is downloadable at Stephen McKeon’s webpage: http://pages.uoregon.edu/smckeon/  
93 
of hostile takeover. This is consistent with Hypothesis 4 and proves the disciplining role of the 
threat of hostile takeover for firms with high organization capital. 
[Table 2.7 About Here] 
 
5  Robustness Tests 
5.1  Alternative Measures of Organization Capital 
 Measurement error is a concern in organization capital for the following reasons. SG&A 
expenditure, which is an essential variable to measure organization capital, cannot account for 
all parts of organization capital. SG&A expenditure includes some part of organization capital 
such as employee wages. However, it may not fully indicate certain conceptual elements such as 
team-work. Furthermore, not all SG&A expenditure contributes directly to organization capital, 
which we can observe as an example in managerial perks. Following the methodology of Li et 
al. (2017), each firm is annually sorted into decile groups on the basis of the firms’ organization 
capital. This decile variable replaces the absolute value of organization capital in Equation (3). 
By doing so, the concern of measurement error can be reduced.  
 The relation between annual decile rank of organization capital (OC_DECILE) and 
corporate cash holdings is presented in Table 2.8. There are significantly positive associations of 
OC_DECILE and subsequent corporate cash holdings, which suggests that Hypothesis 1 is 
supported when the alternative measure of organization capital is used. 
 [Table 2.8 About Here] 
 
 As a robustness test, I use industry-median adjusted organization capital (IND_ADJ_OC) 
in the following way. In each year, I group all the firms into Fama–French 10 industries. Then, 
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within each industry, I estimate the industry-median value of organization capital and subtract it 
from each firm’s organization capital. Table 2.9 illustrates a significantly positive relation 
between organization capital and subsequent growth opportunities, confirming that Hypothesis 2 
continues to hold even when measurement error is reduced. 
 [Table 2.9 About Here] 
 
 To measure pure SG&A expenditure, Enache and Srivastava (2017) use Main SG&A 
calculated by the amount of SG&A expenditure exceeding the sum of advertising and R&D 
expenditures. Then, they divide Main SG&A into two portions: maintenance and investment. 
The maintenance portion entails current operations such as office rents. However, the investment 
portion of Main SG&A is more significantly related to future earnings and organization capital. 
 In identifying the maintenance portion of Main SG&A, it is necessary to consider that the 
maintenance portion of Main SG&A supports current revenues. For each firm i, the maintenance 
portion of Main SG&A is estimated using the following equation:  
 
       𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂ 𝑖𝑡 = ?̂?1 × 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡                                       (7) 
  
 where for firm i and year t, 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂  indicates the estimated 
maintenance portion of Main SG&A; ?̂?1 is the estimated coefficient of 𝛽1 based on the model in 
Equation (8); and 𝑅𝐸𝑉 denotes total revenues scaled by total book value of assets.  
 Employing Enache and Srivastava’s (2017) model, I estimate firm i’s coefficients by 
running the following industry-year regression: 
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                  𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + ɛi,t                    (8) 
  
 where for firm i and year t, 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴 is Main SG&A expenditure calculated by the 
amount of SG&A expenditure exceeding the sum of advertising and R&D expenditures; 𝑅𝐸𝑉 is 
defined as total revenues scaled by total book value of assets; 𝑅𝐸𝑉_𝐷𝐸𝐶 is a dummy variable 
that is equal to 1 if revenues decrease and 0 otherwise; and 𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆 denotes a dummy variable that 
is equal to 0 if income before extraordinary items are greater or equal to zero, 1 otherwise. Firms 
in the finance industry and the “almost nothing” category in Fama–French 48-industry 
classification (Fama & French 1997) are excluded. 
 By using the estimated maintenance portion of Main SG&A (𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂ ) 
obtained in Equation (7), I measure the estimated investment portion of Main SG&A 
(𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂ ) in the equation set forth below: 
 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂ 𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡  −  𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴𝑖𝑡̂                     (9) 
 
 To apply Enache and Srivastava’s (2017) variable, I replace SG&A expenditure in 
Equation (1) with the investment portion of Main SG&A. Therefore, the modified version of 
Equation (1) is the following: 
 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑂𝐶0 = 
𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂ 1
𝑔+𝛿0
                               (10) 
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 where INV_OC0 denotes the initial value of organization capital using the investment 
portion of Main SG&A. 𝐼𝑁𝑉_𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛_𝑆𝐺𝐴̂ 1 is the estimated investment portion of Main SG&A 
expenditure at time 1. The definitions of g and δ0 are illustrated in Equation (1).   
 Based on Equation (10), I obtain the initial value of organization capital using the 
investment portion of Main SG&A. Then, projected values of organization capital are estimated 
by using the same methodology in Equation (2). Panel A of Table 2.10 describes the effect of 
organization capital using the investment portion of Main SG&A (INV_OC) on the sensitivity of 
cash reserves to cash flows. The variable of interest is CF × INV_OC. If Hypothesis 3 is true, 
the interaction term will have a significantly positive coefficient. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A 
in Table 2.10 show that the coefficient of CF × INV_OC on ΔCASH is positive and significant 
for positive internal cash flow firms, but not for nonpositive internal cash flow firms. These 
results reveal that as organization capital increases, firms hold more cash reserves from internal 
cash flows, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3; however, Hypothesis 3 is only supported 
when firms have positive internal cash flows. 
 Panel B of Table 2.10 reports OLS regression results based on the same specification in 
Table 2.7 but replacing the organization capital (OC) with INV_OC. The key variable of interest 
is the interaction between organization capital using investment component of Main SG&A 
expenditure and hostile takeover (INV_OC × HT). The coefficients of INV_OC × HT on 
subsequent cash holdings are negative and significant. These robustness tests are supporting 
evidence for Hypothesis 4 that the positive association between organization capital and cash 
holdings is weaker for firms with a stronger threat of hostile takeover. 
 [Table 2.10 About Here] 
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5.2  Omitted Variable and Endogeneity Concerns 
 My results so far bring about concerns about omitted variable and endogeneity problems. 
These concerns arise from unobservable or omitted variable differences between changing the 
degree of a firm’s organization capital. It can be assumed that the change in these unobservable 
or omitted variables might affect corporate cash holding decisions. A typical example of 
endogeneity is a reverse causality problem: managers who have more cash reserves may invest 
more in organization capital. 
 To account for the concern of omitted variable and endogeneity, I conduct a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) test using the industry-median organization capital as an instrumental 
variable. This instrument is appealing because it is unlikely to be affected by firm-specific 
shocks. Hence, using the industry-median organization capital as an instrumental variable can 
alleviate unobservable or omitted variables bias driven by firm-specific shocks. Column (1) of 
Table 2.11 indicates that industry-median organization capital has a positive and significant 
association with a firm’s organization capital. In Column (2) of Table 2.11, to alleviate reverse 
causality concerns due to simultaneity, the dependent variable is measured one year forward. 
The second-stage regression result shows that the instrumented value of OC has a positive and 
significant impact on subsequent corporate cash holding, implying that my empirical results are 
maintained using the 2SLS test. 
 [Table 2.11 About Here] 
 
 Using OLS change regressions, I further address the omitted variable and endogeneity 
problems. OLS change regressions implement yearly changes in the dependent and independent 
variables, which better explains the incremental influences of organization capital on corporate 
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cash holdings. By doing so, these influences are estimated after the bias coming from time-
invariant omitted variables is removed. The following model is used to estimate OLS change 
regressions: 
 
 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 𝛥𝑂𝐶𝑖,𝑡 +  𝜆 𝛥𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  ɛi,t                 (11) 
  
 where, for firm i, ΔCASH denotes the first difference in corporate cash holdings between 
year t + 1 and the previous year t; ΔOC is a change organization capital scaled by total book 
value of assets in year t from previous year t – 1; Controls include control variables which are 
defined in Appendix A. All control variables are changes in year t from year t – 1. I also include 
year fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (Industry). In my tests, standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-robust and are clustered at the firm level. To mitigate reverse causality 
concerns, the dependent variable is measured one year forward. 
 The results of the change regressions are presented in Table 2.12. The coefficient of 
change in organization capital is significantly positive for subsequent changes in corporate cash 
holdings. This result suggests that my finding continues to hold even after mitigating the omitted 
variable and endogeneity problems.  
[Table 2.12 About Here] 
 
5.3  Difference-in-Difference Approach 
 In this section, I conduct the difference-in-difference (DID) test on how an exogenous 
shock to organization capital affects corporate cash holdings activities. I use the recent global 
financial crisis as an exogenous shock that affects financial constraints as well as organization 
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capital in a significant manner, which should affect a firm’s subsequent cash holdings.21 I first 
measure the change in organization capital from the pre-shock year (2006) to the post-shock 
year (2010). Based on the change in organization capital around this event period, I categorize 
firms into three groups containing the same number of observations. A group with the largest 
increase in organization capital is constructed as a sample of treatment firms. Two other groups 
are constructed as a control group of firms. Then, I create the treatment dummy (Treatment), 
which is equal to one if a firm belongs to a treatment group and zero otherwise. Propensity 
scores are obtained by conducting a probit regression of Treatment on all control variables 
presented in equation (3).  
 I then proceed to construct pairs through the propensity score matching procedures. Each 
observation in the treatment group is matched to the observation from the control group with the 
closest propensity score. I identify 385 unique pairs of treatment–control matches. The results 
from the probit regressions for the pre-match and post-match samples are shown in Panel A of 
Table 2.13. Column (2) of Panel A ensures that, after the propensity score matching procedures, 
no independent variables significantly drive the difference in corporate cash holdings. In Panel 
B, I compute the differences between the treatment and control firms according to their 
characteristics. After the propensity score matching procedures, my treatment and control firms 
have no statistically significant differences in their characteristics, which also ensures that the 
changes in corporate cash holdings are caused only by the exogenous change in organization 
capital.  
                                                 
21 During the peak of the global financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008), it was difficult for banks to roll over their 
short-term debt due to a bank run by short-term creditors. For example, new loans to large borrowers decreased by 
47%, compared to the 2nd quarter of 2007 (Ivashina & Scharfstein 2010). After the failure of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008, a high volume of employee layoffs followed, which can be related to a shock in organization capital. 
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 Panel C of Table 2.13 reports the results from the DID test. The DID estimator is reported 
in Column (3). The average change in organization capital for treatment group is 0.011, and that 
for the control group is –0.013. The DID estimator for the subsequent corporate cash holdings is 
0.024 and statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that an exogenous increase in 
organization capital could lead a firm to hold more cash reserves. 
 [Table 2.13 About Here] 
 
5.4  Subsample Analysis 
 In 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) was enacted and 
applied to tax filings. According to JGTRRA, the tax rates on dividends were reduced and thus 
dividends were preferred by shareholders, which affected corporate cash holding decisions in 
2003. To ensure that my results are not induced by JGTRRA, I exclude observations in the year 
2003 and investigate the relation between organization capital and cash holdings. In Columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 2.14, the positive coefficients of organization capital on subsequent cash 
reserves are significant, confirming Hypothesis 1.  
 Furthermore, I also check whether the positive association between organization capital 
and subsequent cash reserves merely reflects the results from the U.S. financial crisis. Columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 2.14 present the relation between organization capital and subsequent cash 
reserves, which remains significantly positive even after excluding observations between 2007 
and 2009. Overall, Table 2.14 shows that JGTRRA or financial crisis does not induce my 
empirical findings. 
 [Table 2.14 About Here] 
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5.5  Idiosyncratic Risk 
 Irvine and Pontiff (2009) find that idiosyncratic risk reflects the volatility of cash flows. In 
this context, firms with higher idiosyncratic risk are exposed to larger negative cash flow shocks, 
which increases their precautionary demand for corporate cash holdings.22 Consistent with this 
argument, Bates et al. (2009) find that a firm’s cash reserves tend to be greater when higher 
idiosyncratic risk is present. In this sense, idiosyncratic risk can be an important determinant of 
the precautionary motive for cash reserves. 
 Hence, I include idiosyncratic risk (IVOL) as an additional control variable in my baseline 
regression model.23 Table 2.15 exhibits that there is a significant and positive relation between 
IVOL and subsequent cash reserves, consistent with the prior literature’s argument that firms with 
higher idiosyncratic risk tend to accumulate more cash holdings. Confirming my main findings, 
the coefficients of organization capital remain positive and significant, even after accounting for 
idiosyncratic risk.   
[Table 2.15 About Here] 
 
6  Conclusion 
 In this study, I examine the impact of organization capital on corporate cash holdings 
from 1987 through 2016. I find that firms with greater organization capital have more cash 
holdings. My research establishes three channels underlying the positive relationship between 
organization capital and corporate cash reserves. First, I find a positive influence of organization 
                                                 
22 Han and Qiu (2007) show that a positive relation between cash flow volatility and cash reserves exists when firms 
are financially constrained. 
23 Following McLean (2010), I measure idiosyncratic risk by the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of 
a firm’s monthly stock returns on the monthly returns of market index over the previous 36 months. 
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capital on the growth opportunities of a corporation, which can encourage firms to hold more 
cash reserves to take advantage of better growth opportunities. Second, I also find that 
organization capital increases cash-cash flow sensitivity, implying that an increase in 
organization capital can lead firms to rely more on internal financing. Consequently, greater 
organization capital requires firms to have more cash holdings. Third, regarding the corporate 
governance channel, the positive relation between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings becomes weaker as the threat of hostile takeover becomes stronger. Taken together, my 
paper contributes to the literature on the corporate cash holdings by identifying (i) more growth 
opportunities as well as (ii) more financial constraints for firms with high organization capital 
and (iii) disciplining role of corporate governance for high organization capital firms.  
 My findings are consistent when using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) test, change 
regressions, and the difference-in-difference (DID) test for omitted variables and endogeneity 
concerns. I continue to find supporting evidence using alternative measures of organization 
capital such as annual decile rank of organization capital or industry-median adjusted 
organization capital. When the investment portion of Main SG&A from Enache and Srivastava 
(2017) is used, the positive relation between organization capital and financial constraints of 
firms is only significant for firms with positive internal cash flows. Firms with negative internal 
cash flows show an insignificant association between organization capital and financial 
constraints of firms. 
 Based on my finding on the positive effect that organization capital has on corporate cash 
holdings, my study could provide an insight into why companies in the late 2000s held so much 
more cash than in earlier years: the high demand for organization capital in today’s knowledge-
based economy could require companies to have more cash holdings. Regarding potential 
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agency problems associated with this high level of cash holdings of such firms, I find that the 
threat of hostile takeover plays a significant disciplining role for such firms. The findings in my 
paper (i) highlight the precautionary motive for corporate cash holdings and the underlying 
channels that explain how organization capital and corporate cash holdings are related, and (ii) 
emphasize a growing importance of the disciplining role of corporate governance for high 
organization capital firms. 
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Table 2.1 Univariate Statistics for Sample Firms 
 
Notes:  
Table 2.1 indicates summary statistics for variables in this essay. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The Sample consists of 70,317 firm-year observations from January of 1987 through December of 2016. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
Number of obs = 70,317     
Variable 
25th 
Percentile 
Mean Median 
75th  
Percentile 
Std. Dev 
CASH 0.032 0.198 0.114 0.293 0.217 
Q 1.066 2.122 1.474 2.329 1.943 
OC 0.033 0.561 0.184 0.702 0.876 
SIZE 3.523 5.137 4.986 6.630 2.211 
DIV 0.000 0.373 0.000 1.000 0.484 
CF 0.001 0.011 0.074 0.124 0.245 
NWC -0.035 0.078 0.062 0.202 0.202 
CAPEX 0.018 0.062 0.039 0.078 0.070 
N_DEBT -0.016 0.025 0.000 0.021 0.159 
ACQ 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.004 0.056 
ASSETS 33.883 2033.942 146.402 757.475 7985.696 
AGE 6.000 15.445 11.000 21.000 13.008 
PROF 0.030 0.062 0.111 0.173 0.233 
TANG 0.085 0.278 0.203 0.408 0.241 
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Table 2.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
F1_ 
CASH 
Q OC SIZE DIV CF NWC CAPEX N_DEBT ACQ ASSETS AGE PROF TANG 
CASH 1.0000              
Q 0.3639 1.0000             
OC 0.2014 0.2545 1.0000            
SIZE -0.2299 -0.1849 -0.4191 1.0000           
DIV -0.2051 -0.0710 -0.1724 0.3660 1.0000          
CF -0.2737 -0.2577 -0.3605 0.3315 0.1859 1.0000         
NWC -0.2456 -0.2156 -0.0608 -0.0743 0.0214 0.2923 1.0000        
CAPEX -0.2004 0.0072 -0.0290 0.0226 0.0233 0.0750 -0.1370 1.0000       
N_DEBT -0.0719 -0.0141 -0.0529 0.0662 0.0151 -0.0100 0.0003 0.1495 1.0000      
ACQ -0.1113 -0.0407 -0.0704 0.1369 0.0249 0.0529 -0.0246 -0.0820 0.3585 1.0000     
ASSETS -0.1004 -0.0580 -0.1300 0.5192 0.2238 0.0895 -0.0995 -0.0004 0.0108 0.0132 1.0000    
AGE -0.1951 -0.1480 -0.3478 0.3795 0.3501 0.1636 0.1036 -0.1018 -0.0464 0.0048 0.2558 1.0000   
PROF -0.3204 -0.2537 -0.3578 0.3683 0.2022 0.9059 0.2737 0.0694 -0.0178 0.0774 0.0942 0.1668 1.0000  
TANG -0.4011 -0.1828 -0.2136 0.1796 0.1810 0.1379 -0.1996 0.5969 0.0683 -0.0703 0.0696 0.0566 0.1325 1.0000 
 
Notes:  
All correlations that are significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed, are bolded. The definitions of variables are described in Appendix A. 
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Table 2.3 Median Cash Holdings for Organization Capital Deciles 
 
Notes:  
Table 2.3 illustrates the median ratio of cash holdings to total assets for organization capital deciles. The Sample 
consists of 70,317 firm-year observations from January of 1987 through December of 2016. Observations are annually 
ranked into 10 groups based on the magnitude of organization capital. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Organization Capital Ranking 
Median  
Organization Capital 
Median  
Cash Holding 
Obs. 
Lowest 0.0040 
 
0.0663 7,044 
2 0.0181 0.0808 7,029 
3 0.0359 0.0844 7,035 
4 0.0665 0.0910 7,029 
5 0.1135 0.0987 7,030 
6 0.1918 0.1030 7,035 
7 0.3428 0.1220 7,033 
8 0.6280 0.1455 7,031 
9 1.0938 0.1970 7,033 
Highest 2.3919 0.2899 7,018 
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Table 2.4 Organization Capital and Corporate Cash Holdings 
This table shows the results of the pooled OLS regressions of corporate cash holdings on organization capital. In 
Column (1), one year forward (t+1) cash holdings is a dependent variable. In Column (2) and (3), I replace one year 
forward (t+1) cash holdings by two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent variable of 
interest is OC defined as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. The definitions of other variables 
are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) 
level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
CASH 
(t + 3) 
    
OC 0.0109 0.0083 0.0061 
 (4.991)*** (3.601)*** (2.465)** 
    
SIZE -0.0151 -0.0145 -0.0143 
 (-15.034)*** (-13.721)*** (-12.759)*** 
    
DIV -0.0300 -0.0311 -0.0316 
 (-9.616)*** (-9.355)*** (-8.923)*** 
    
CF -0.0090 -0.0292 -0.0361 
 (-1.135) (-3.317)*** (-3.810)*** 
    
NWC -0.2167 -0.2100 -0.1992 
 (-21.056)*** (-19.071)*** (-16.744)*** 
    
Q 0.0235 0.0211 0.0194 
 (25.496)*** (21.347)*** (18.052)*** 
    
CAPEX -0.4971 -0.4482 -0.4105 
 (-25.209)*** (-21.286)*** (-18.272)*** 
    
N_DEBT 0.0296 0.0227 0.0185 
 (5.876)*** (4.094)*** (3.232)*** 
    
ACQ -0.4292 -0.3901 -0.3600 
 (-30.390)*** (-25.766)*** (-22.360)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 70,317    62,032   54,871   
adj. R-sq 0.350 0.340 0.329 
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Table 2.5 Organization Capital and Growth Opportunities 
This table reports the relation between organization capital and growth opportunities. Dependent variable is Tobin’s 
Q (Q), which is measured as the market value of equity minus the book value of equity plus the book value of total 
assets. In Column (1), one year forward (t+1) Q is a dependent variable. In Column (2) and (3), I replace one year 
forward (t+1) Q by two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent variable of interest is 
OC defined as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. The definitions of other variables are 
described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) 
level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Q 
(t + 1) 
Q 
(t + 2) 
Q 
(t + 3) 
    
OC 0.2966 0.2514 0.2190 
 (13.455)*** (10.884)*** (8.880)*** 
    
ASSETS -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-2.572)** (-2.572)*** (-12.759)*** 
    
AGE -0.0035 -0.0024 -0.0021 
 (-3.151)*** (-2.072)** (-1.706)* 
    
PROF -0.3267 -0.3700 -0.3310 
 (-1.872)* (-1.923)* (-1.632) 
    
TANG -0.7209 -0.6471 -0.6506 
 (-7.285)*** (-5.948)*** (-5.499)*** 
    
CF -0.9715 -1.0677 -1.1018 
 (-8.232)*** (-7.837)*** (-7.538)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 69,534    60,919   53,591   
adj. R-sq 0.183 0.184 0.181 
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Table 2.6 Organization Capital and Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
This table illustrates the results for OLS regression estimates of the Equation (5). Dependent variable is ΔCASH, which 
is the change in the ratio of holdings of cash and marketable securities to total book value of assets. The definitions of 
other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through 
December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 
are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
  
Dependent Variable ΔCASH 
  
CF -0.0095 
 (-0.144) 
  
CF × OC 0.2517 
 (2.476)** 
  
Q 0.0125 
 (8.172)*** 
  
SIZE 0.0032 
 (2.480)** 
  
  
Industry fixed effects Yes 
  
Year fixed effects Yes 
N 53,413   
adj. R-sq 0.025 
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Table 2.7 Threat of a Hostile Takeover 
This table presents the effect of a hostile takeover on the relation between organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings. In Column (1), one year forward (t+1) cash holdings is a dependent variable. In Column (2) and (3), I replace 
one year forward (t+1) cash holdings by two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent 
variable of interest is the intersection between organization capital and hostile takeover (OC × HT). The definitions 
of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through 
December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 
are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
CASH 
(t + 3) 
    
OC 0.0116 0.0081 0.0066 
 (4.299)*** (2.879)*** (2.161)** 
    
OC × HT -0.0646 -0.0443 -0.0415 
 (-2.918)*** (-2.010)** (-1.806)* 
    
HT -0.1151 -0.0895 -0.0792 
 (-5.080)*** (-3.830)*** (-3.242)*** 
    
SIZE -0.0132 -0.0130 -0.0127 
 (-10.991)*** (-10.311)*** (-9.566)*** 
    
DIV -0.0263 -0.0292 -0.0302 
 (-7.562)*** (-7.966)*** (-7.746)*** 
    
CF -0.0142 -0.0335 -0.0434 
 (-1.665)* (-3.581)*** (-4.337)*** 
    
NWC -0.2274 -0.2175 -0.2043 
 (-19.849)*** (-17.963)*** (-15.864)*** 
    
Q 0.0229 0.0202 0.0184 
 (23.394)*** (19.405)*** (16.377)*** 
    
CAPEX -0.5372 -0.4825 -0.4423 
 (-23.498)*** (-19.806)*** (-17.059)*** 
    
N_DEBT 0.0273 0.0218 0.0186 
 (4.787)*** (3.543)*** (2.949)*** 
    
ACQ -0.4429 -0.4011 -0.3760 
 (-28.926)*** (-24.202)*** (-21.162)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 56,205    50,487   44,878   
adj. R-sq 0.355 0.342 0.330 
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Table 2.8 Annual Decile Rank of Organization Capital 
This table presents the robustness test results by using annual decile rank of organization capital. In Column (1), one 
year forward (t+1) cash holdings is a dependent variable. In Column (2) and (3), I replace one year forward (t+1) cash 
holdings by two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent variable of interest is 
OC_DECILE defined as annual decile rank based on the level of OC. The definitions of other variables are described 
in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
CASH 
(t + 3) 
    
OC_DECILE 0.0046 0.0037 0.0032 
 (6.497)*** (5.020)*** (4.099)*** 
    
SIZE -0.0141 -0.0137 -0.0135 
 (-13.497)*** (-12.461)*** (-11.641)*** 
    
DIV -0.0280 -0.0295 -0.0302 
 (-8.948)*** (-8.839)*** (-8.499)*** 
    
CF -0.0133 -0.0320 -0.0375 
 (-1.708)* (-3.656)*** (-3.950)*** 
    
NWC -0.2174 -0.2107 -0.1998 
 (-21.110)*** (-19.131)*** (-16.807)*** 
    
Q 0.0238 0.0213 0.0195 
 (25.978)*** (21.679)*** (18.283)*** 
    
CAPEX -0.4968 -0.4480 -0.4108 
 (-25.139)*** (-21.235)*** (-18.239)*** 
    
N_DEBT 0.0300 0.0235 0.0194 
 (5.968)*** (4.235)*** (3.390)*** 
    
ACQ -0.4271 -0.3885 -0.3588 
 (-30.241)*** (-25.640)*** (-22.245)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 70,317    62,032   54,871   
adj. R-sq 0.351 0.341 0.330 
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Table 2.9 Industry-Median Adjusted Organization Capital 
This table reports the robustness test results by using industry-median adjusted organization capital. Dependent 
variable is Tobin’s Q (Q), which is measured as the market value of equity minus the book value of equity plus the 
book value of total assets. In Column (1), one year forward (t+1) Q is a dependent variable. In Column (2) and (3), I 
replace one year forward (t+1) Q by two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent 
variable of interest is IND_ADJ_OC defined as organization capital minus industry-median organization capital in the 
Fama-French 10 industry classification scheme. The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The 
sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables 
are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and 
heteroscedasticity.   
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Q 
(t + 1) 
Q 
(t + 2) 
Q 
(t + 3) 
    
IND_ADJ_OC 0.2792 0.2329 0.1952 
 (12.496)*** (9.901)*** (7.748)*** 
    
ASSETS -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (-2.348)** (-2.620)*** (-2.720)*** 
    
AGE -0.0041 -0.0030 -0.0026 
 (-3.658)*** (-2.532)** (-2.185)** 
    
PROF -0.3443 -0.3860 -0.3479 
 (-1.975)** (-2.009)** (-1.717)* 
    
TANG -0.7332 -0.6593 -0.6647 
 (-7.409)*** (-6.062)*** (-5.622)*** 
    
CF -0.9829 -1.0792 -1.1170 
 (-8.325)*** (-7.923)*** (-7.642)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 69,534    60,919   53,591   
adj. R-sq 0.181 0.182 0.179 
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Table 2.10 Using Investment Component of Main SG&A Expenditure 
This table shows OLS regression results based on the same specification in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, but replace the 
organization capital (OC) with INV_OC. INV_OC is defined as the organization capital using the investment portion 
of Main SG&A expenditure from Enache and Srivastava (2017). In Panel A, dependent variable is ΔCASH, which is 
the change in the ratio of holdings of cash and marketable securities to total book value of assets. All dependent 
variables are measured one year forward. In Column (1) of Panel B, one year forward (t+1) cash holdings is a 
dependent variable. In Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B, I replace one year forward (t+1) cash holdings by two-year 
(t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent variable of interest is the intersection between 
organization capital using investment component of Main SG&A expenditure and hostile takeover (INV_OC × HT). 
The definitions of other variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January 
of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.   
 
Panel A: Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity 
 (1) (2) 
  Positive 
Internal  
Cash Flow  
Firms 
Non-positive  
Internal 
Cash Flow  
Firms 
Dependent Variable ΔCASH ΔCASH 
   
CF 0.1293 0.4595 
 (8.872)*** (2.049)** 
   
CF × INV_OC 0.0539 0.1516 
 (3.351)*** (0.577) 
   
Q 0.0046 0.0258 
 (6.688)*** (3.038)*** 
   
SIZE -0.0006 0.0348 
 (-2.265)** (2.824)*** 
   
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 26,651   8,930   
adj. R-sq 0.034 0.015 
 
Panel B: Threat of Hostile Takeover 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
CASH 
(t + 3) 
    
INV_OC 0.0153 0.0136 0.0117 
 (3.802)*** (3.369)*** (2.743)*** 
    
INV_OC × HT -0.0103 -0.0094 -0.0085 
 (-4.906)*** (-4.404)*** (-3.798)*** 
    
HT -0.1290 -0.0956 -0.0828 
 (-5.278)*** (-3.934)*** (-3.299)*** 
    
SIZE -0.0161 -0.0157 -0.0157 
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 (-10.830)*** (-10.269)*** (-9.774)*** 
    
DIV -0.0237 -0.0258 -0.0265 
 (-5.475)*** (-5.761)*** (-5.588)*** 
    
CF -0.0340 -0.0509 -0.0580 
 (-3.391)*** (-4.825)*** (-5.008)*** 
    
NWC -0.2244 -0.2097 -0.1966 
 (-17.212)*** (-15.645)*** (-13.905)*** 
    
Q 0.0228 0.0196 0.0179 
 (20.974)*** (17.443)*** (14.748)*** 
    
CAPEX -0.5264 -0.4754 -0.4372 
 (-21.251)*** (-18.574)*** (-15.999)*** 
    
N_DEBT 0.0283 0.0248 0.0177 
 (4.249)*** (3.565)*** (2.533)** 
    
ACQ -0.4676 -0.4218 -0.3887 
 (-24.520)*** (-20.810)*** (-17.840)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 36,400    33,354   29,798 
adj. R-sq 0.378 0.364 0.351 
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Table 2.11 Two-Stage Least Squares Regression Analysis 
This table exhibits the results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis. All dependent variables are 
measured one year forward. The first stage regression result is presented in Column (1). In the first stage regression, 
the instrumental variable of organization capital is the industry-median organization capital. In Column (2), corporate 
cash holding is a dependent variable in the second stage regression. The definitions of other variables are described in 
Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both clustering at the 
firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
 
 1st stage 2nd stage 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable OC 
CASH 
(t + 1) 
IV: Industry Median 
Organization Capital 
0.8086  
 (19.221)***  
   
Fitted OC  0.1596 
  (10.472)*** 
   
SIZE -0.0836 -0.0028 
 (-24.303)*** (-1.663)* 
   
DIV -0.0302 -0.0234 
 (-2.808)*** (-6.339)*** 
   
CF -0.8617 0.1226 
 (-21.382)*** (7.245)*** 
   
NWC -0.1379 -0.2000 
 (-3.434)*** (-16.246))*** 
   
Q 0.0623 0.0136 
 (14.468)*** (8.552)*** 
   
CAPEX 0.1942 -0.5413 
 (2.750)*** (-22.830)*** 
   
N_DEBT -0.2177 0.0610 
 (-10.435)*** (8.916)*** 
   
ACQ 0.0238 -0.4261 
 (0.444) (-26.138)*** 
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
   
N 70,317   70,317   
adj. R-sq 0.370 0.118 
 
  
116 
Table 2.12 Change Regression Analysis 
This table provides the results of the pooled OLS change regressions for organization capital and corporate cash 
holdings. All dependent and independent variables are first differences. The independent variable of interest is ΔOC 
defined as a yearly change in organization capital divided by total book value of assets. A yearly change in cash 
reserves is a dependent variable which is measured one year forward. The definitions of other variables are described 
in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
  
Dependent Variable ΔCASH 
(t + 1) 
  
ΔOC 0.0078 
 (2.693)*** 
  
ΔSIZE -0.0264 
 (-9.255)*** 
  
ΔDIV 0.0033 
 (1.583) 
  
ΔCF -0.0001 
 (-0.026) 
  
ΔNWC 0.0511 
 (6.510)*** 
  
ΔQ 0.0025 
 (3.825)*** 
  
ΔCAPEX -0.0513 
 (-4.473)*** 
  
ΔN_DEBT -0.0037 
 (-1.119) 
  
ΔACQ 0.0382 
 (5.494)*** 
  
Industry fixed effects Yes 
  
Year fixed effects Yes 
  
N 55,833    
adj. R-sq 0.018 
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Table 2.13 Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
This table indicates results of the difference-in-difference (DID) tests on how exogenous shock in organization capital 
affect corporate cash holdings. I first measure the change in organization capital from the pre-shock year (2006) to the 
post-shock year (2010). Based on the change in organization capital around this period, I categorize observations into 
three groups containing the same amount of observations. Observations with larger increase in organization capital 
are presented in the top group whereas observations with smaller increase in organization capital are presented in the 
bottom group. Next, I create the treatment dummy (Treatment) which is equal to one if an observation is placed in the 
top group and zero otherwise. Panel A shows parameter estimates from the probit regressions for the pre-match and 
post-match groups. Propensity scores are obtained by conducting a probit regression of Treatment on all control 
variables from the baseline regression model in equation (3). I match each observation in the top group (treatment 
observations) to an observation from other two groups (control observations) with the closest propensity score. If any 
control observation is matched with multiple treatment observations, I maintain only one pair with the closest 
propensity score. Panel B describes the univariate comparisons between the treatment and control firms’ characteristics. 
Panel C presents the results of DID test. CASH(t+1) is one year forward (t+1) cash holdings. In Panels A and B, the 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. In Panel C, standard errors reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 
99th percentiles. 
 
Panel A: Pre-match and Post-Match Probit Regressions 
 (1) (2) 
 Pre-Match Post-Match 
Dependent Variable Treatment Treatment 
   
SIZE 
0.1122 0.0067 
(5.93)*** (0.26) 
   
DIV 
0.1856 -0.0648 
(2.69)*** (-0.65) 
   
CF 
-0.7083 -0.3074 
(-4.18)*** (-1.20) 
   
NWC 
0.1110 0.2822 
(0.52) (0.94) 
   
Q 
0.0709 -0.0034 
(3.35)*** (-0.12) 
   
CAPEX 
0.5546 -0.1151 
(1.14) (-0.17) 
   
N_DEBT 
0.2700 0.1547 
(1.30) (0.48) 
   
ACQ 
0.1572 -0.0697 
(0.31) (-0.09) 
   
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 1,822   770 
Pseudo R-sq 0.047 0.003 
 
Panel B: Differences in Observables 
 Pre-Match  Post-Match 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 Treatment Control Differences  Treatment Control Differences 
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Panel C: Differences in Differences Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Mean Treatment 
Difference 
(After – Before) 
Mean Control 
Difference 
(After – Before) 
Mean DiD Estimator 
(Treatment – Control) 
T-statistics for  
DiD Estimator 
CASH 
(t+1) 
0.011 -0.013 0.024 
2.181 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) 
     
 
  
SIZE 6.485 5.642 0.843***  6.205 6.283 -0.078 
DIV 0.484 0.353 0.131***  0.438 0.470 -0.032 
CF 0.040 0.039 0.001  0.042 0.061 -0.019 
NWC 0.054 0.053 0.001  0.068 0.061 0.007 
Q 2.720 2.179 0.541***  2.275 2.272 0.003 
CAPEX 0.062 0.056 0.006  0.057 0.060 -0.003 
N_DEBT 0.050 0.026 0.024***  0.044 0.037 0.007 
ACQ 0.034 0.027 0.007*  0.035 0.034 0.001 
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Table 2.14 Subsample Analysis 
This table reports the results of additional tests to ensure the robustness of the regression model specified in Equation 
(3). The independent variable of interest is OC defined as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. 
In Columns (1) and (2), year 2003 is excluded to be free of any effect of Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act (JGTRRA). In Columns (3) and (4), all observations between 2007 and 2009 are removed to exclude the effect of 
the U.S. financial crisis. In Columns (1) and (3), one year forward (t+1) cash holdings is a dependent variable. In 
Column (2) and (4), I replace one year forward (t+1) cash holdings by two-year (t+2) forward. The definitions of other 
variables are described in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through 
December of 2016. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% (two-sided) level, respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 
are robust to both clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Excluding  
Year 2003 
Excluding  
Year 2003 
Excluding  
Years 2007-2009 
Excluding  
Years 2007-2009 
Dependent Variable CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
     
OC 0.0104 0.0077 0.0102 0.0075 
 (4.809)*** (3.386)*** (4.642)*** (3.236)*** 
     
SIZE -0.0152 -0.0146 -0.0143 -0.0136 
 (-15.258)*** (-13.834)*** (-14.193)*** (-12.798)*** 
     
DIV -0.0293 -0.0302 -0.0283 -0.0296 
 (-9.409)*** (-9.123)*** (-8.955)*** (-8.744)*** 
     
CF -0.0088 -0.0298 -0.0110 -0.0316 
 (-1.116) (-3.414)*** (-1.352) (-3.443)*** 
     
NWC -0.2157 -0.2085 -0.2109 -0.2034 
 (-21.021)*** (-18.985)*** (-20.321)*** (-18.322)*** 
     
Q 0.0234 0.0211 0.0238 0.0211 
 (25.173)*** (21.162)*** (25.897)*** (21.423)*** 
     
CAPEX -0.4897 -0.4391 -0.4896 -0.4460 
 (-24.920)*** (-20.843)*** (-24.588)*** (-20.954)*** 
     
N_DEBT 0.0272 0.0206 0.0289 0.0231 
 (5.329)*** (3.680)*** (5.597)*** (4.086)*** 
     
ACQ -0.4263 -0.3859 -0.4273 -0.3887 
 (-30.004)*** (-25.329)*** (-28.882)*** (-24.506)*** 
     
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 67,807    59,713    62,197    54,477   
adj. R-sq 0.348 0.338 0.347 0.335 
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Table 2.15 Idiosyncratic Risk 
This table indicates the OLS regression results after including IVOL as an additional control variable. IVOL is 
idiosyncratic risk following McLean (2010), measured by the standard deviation of residuals from a regression of a 
firm’s monthly stock returns on the monthly returns of market index over the previous 36 months. In Column (1), one 
year forward (t+1) cash holdings is a dependent variable. In Column (2) and (3), I replace one year forward (t+1) cash 
holdings by two-year (t+2) and three-year (t+3) forward, respectively. The independent variable of interest is OC 
defined as organization capital divided by total book value of assets. The definitions of other variables are described 
in Appendix A. The sample firm-year observations are from January of 1987 through December of 2016. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *,  **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% (two-sided) level, 
respectively. All variables are winsorized at both the 1st and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are robust to both 
clustering at the firm level and heteroscedasticity.  
  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CASH 
(t + 1) 
CASH 
(t + 2) 
CASH 
(t + 3) 
    
OC 0.0098 0.0092 0.0066 
 (3.760)*** (3.302)*** (2.225)** 
    
IVOL 0.0069 0.0231 0.0379 
 (0.346) (1.098) (1.660)* 
    
SIZE -0.0157 -0.0151 -0.0148 
 (-14.350)*** (-12.987)*** (-12.000)*** 
    
DIV -0.0306 -0.0317 -0.0323 
 (-9.242)*** (-8.933)*** (-8.508)*** 
    
CF -0.0177 -0.0340 -0.0399 
 (-2.111)** (-3.668)*** (-3.965)*** 
    
NWC -0.2224 -0.2164 -0.2040 
 (-20.431)*** (-18.439)*** (-16.032)*** 
    
Q 0.0248 0.0222 0.0208 
 (24.194)*** (20.206)*** (17.410)*** 
    
CAPEX -0.4925 -0.4403 -0.4039 
 (-22.621)*** (-18.934)*** (-16.259)*** 
    
N_DEBT 0.0372 0.0242 0.0259 
 (6.976)*** (4.038)*** (4.098)*** 
    
ACQ -0.4277 -0.3855 -0.3591 
 (-28.265)*** (-23.460)*** (-20.341)*** 
    
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
   
N 61,699    54,453   48,171   
adj. R-sq 0.356 0.347 0.336 
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Figure 2.1 Average Cash Ratio from 1987 through 2016 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definitions 
CASH Cash ratio, measured as cash and marketable securities divided by 
book value of total assets. 
ΔCASH The change in the ratio of holdings of cash and marketable securities 
to book value of total assets over a year. 
Q Tobin’s Q, measured as the market value of equity minus the book 
value of equity plus the book value of total assets. 
OC Organization capital divided by book value of total assets proposed by 
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013). 
SIZE Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. 
DIV Equal to 1 if a firm paid dividends, 0 otherwise. 
CF Cash flows, proxied as (incomes before extraordinary items + 
depreciation) / book value of total assets. 
NWC Net working capital, calculated by (current asset  ̶  current liabilities   ̶ 
cash and marketable securities) / book value of total assets. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by book value of total assets. 
N_DEBT Net new long-term debt, estimated by net debt issuance divided by 
book value of total assets. 
ACQ Acquisition expenses scaled by book value of total assets. 
ASSETS Book value of total assets. 
AGE Firm age, proxied by the number of years listed on Compustat. 
PROF Profitability, calculated by earnings before interest, depreciation, 
taxes, and amortization divided by book value of total assets. 
TANG Tangibility, estimated by net property, plant, and equipment divided 
by book value of total assets.  
HT Hostile Takeover Index from Cain et al. (2017)  
OC_DECILE Annual decile rank based on the level of OC. 
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IND_ADJ_OC Industry-median adjusted organization capital, measured as OC minus 
industry-median OC under the Fama-French 10 industry classification 
scheme. 
INV_OC Organization capital using the investment portion of Main SG&A 
from Enache and Srivastava (2017). 
IVOL Idiosyncratic risk, measured by the standard deviation of residuals 
from a regression of a firm’s monthly stock returns on the monthly 
returns of market index over the previous 36 months (McLean 2010). 
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